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Throughout the centuries, humans have aspired to comprehend and control the inner workings of the 
mind and brain. Neurofeedback is the process of influencing physiological brain activity by making 
a person aware of it in real-time, thereby allowing self-regulation. Neurofeedback has been gaining 
momentum as a viable treatment option for several mental disorders and as a practical methodology 
for researchers to alter brain function in the attempts to induce particular states of mind.  
The purpose of the present master’s thesis is to investigate whether neurofeedback holds a potential 
to inform about mind-brain causal relationships. The thesis assumes the ontology of mind and brain 
to be the same process seen through different epistemologies and in doing so seeks to investigate 
whether neurofeedback can trace any causal codetermining mind-brain relationships. In keeping with 
this focus the thesis delves into the underlying principles of neurofeedback and the two competing 
theoretical accounts of the “conditioning-and-repair” model and “skill-acquisition” model for the 
therapeutic causal effects of neurofeedback. Here, the two models explanatory power and competing 
assumptions about the causal mechanism of neurofeedback in altering brain activity and by extension 
mental states is discussed. Taking offset in an empirical investigation into the neurophysiological 
basis of language learning efficiency the thesis generates hypotheses that reflects on the models 
accounts of causal inference through neurofeedback. 
In facing up to the question of what the potential neurofeedback holds for investigating mind-brain 
causality the thesis suggests several key favorable aspects, such as the it’s ability to manipulate brain 
activity as the independent variable and measure the effect on states of mind. Moreover, 
neurofeedback provides a method for creating evolving experimental paradigms that can identify 
unpredicted mind-brain relationships and eliminate competing causal hypotheses. Yet, neurofeedback 
also has several limitations in inferring causality, in particular strict unidirectional causality and a 
susceptibility to arguments pointing to a third cause of the mind-brain relationship. Here, it is argued 
that the advantages and limitations are amplified and attenuated respectively when neurofeedback is 
coupled with other methodological approaches. 
The thesis culminates with a new view on causal inference, one in which scientific investigations 
enables causal accounts to gradually increase on a continuum of likelihood rather than being either 
causal or non-causal in an absolutely sense whilst still recognizing the unique potential of 
neurofeedback to investigate mind-brain causal relationships.  
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“The great thing, then, in all education is to make our nervous 
system our ally instead of our enemy. 
It is to fund and capitalize our acquisitions, and live at ease upon 
the interest of the fund. For this we must make automatic and 
habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can, 
and guard against the growing into ways that are likely to be 
disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against the plague. 
The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the 
effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of 
mind will be set free for their own proper work.“ 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Thesis Objective 
Throughout history, there have been three major ways of influencing the brain for the treatment of 
mental disorders, known colloquially as the methods of “the knife, the pill and the therapist couch”, 
or represented by their disciplines as psychosurgery, psychopharmacology and psychotherapy 
(deCharms, 2008a). Now more than ever, there is need for a fourth alternative that encompasses the 
objective of applying neuroscience in evidence-based practice to treat mental disorders. Emerging 
directly from laboratory research, biofeedback and its subcategory neurofeedback measure an 
underlying physiological signal non-invasively and in real-time (Sulzer et al., 2013,p.1-11; Yucha 
and Montgomery, 2008,p.8). The signal is then “fed” back to the individual so that they can learn to 
regulate it, with the intention of improving health and performance. An illustration of a neurofeedback 
setup is seen in (Figure 1); the analysis of psychophysiological measurements keeps pace with data 
acquisition and is then visualized as a feedback signal to the individual, influencing subsequent data 
production and acquisition and thereby forming an iterative loop.  
 
Figure 1. Diagram of the Neurofeedback Loop 
Top left: Psychophysiological signals are measured from the scalp or from within the brain. Top right: The data is 
read by a computer where online analysis is performed. Bottom right: A feedback signal is presented to the individual 
in the form of a graphical or sound according to the recorded brain activity. Bottom Left: The individual learns control 
over the feedback signal by influencing brain activity through intentional and subjective experience (Kübler and 
Kotchoubey, 2007,p.2; Weiskopf et al., 2004,p.6). 
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The purpose of the present thesis is an investigation of the potential of this fourth alternative of 
bio/neurofeedback to inform about mind-brain causal relationships. Causality is the inferred 
necessary relationship between two occurring contiguous events, where one is seen as the cause of 
the other (the effect) (Kurthen, 2010,p.1-14). Causal relationships between mind and brain are 
particular hard to infer, as experimental evidence from neuroscience is often limited to showing that 
a neural correlate of mind exists without knowing its exact neural cause. Moreover, the matter is even 
more complicated by the fact that cognitive functions such as attention, executive function etc. are 
psychologically defined constructs that cannot be measured directly, but must be inferred from 
behaviour (Gazzaniga et al., 2010,p.96-146; Lindeløv, 2015,p.7f). 
Humans introspectively experience the content of their minds or mental states by default, yet have 
little or no way to consciously perceive the concurrent physiological processes taking place in the 
brain, until now (deCharms, 2008,p.1-8, 2007,p.1-9). The breakthrough of neurofeedback has made 
it possible to illuminate the functioning of human brain in real time and thereby access both sides of 
the mind-brain interface simultaneously (ibid.). This approach also has widespread clinical 
implications regarding the treatment of mental disorders and represents a major paradigm shift from 
using biomedical devices not only as a diagnostic tools, but also as a therapeutic tool (Cantor and 
James, 2014, xviii). Moreover, neurofeedback might hold the potential to address questions of 
causality between brain activity and mental functions rather than mere correlations and thus 
represents an exciting new frontier for scientific discovery (LaConte, 2011,p.13; Sulzer et al., 
2013,p.7).  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
What potential does neurofeedback hold for investigating mind-brain causal relationships 
 
1.3 Metatheoretical standpoint 
The matter of the relationship between mind and brain (or mind-body) is often a topic of great debate, 
a debate that often precludes an easy answer to the question of whether the mind can be reduced to 
the brain (Chalmers, 2003,p.1-41, 1995,p.1-17; Kurthen, 2010,p.1-4). The present thesis is no 
exception. While it deals with aspects of the mind-brain issue, in doing so it naturally omits discussing 
certain dimensions of the larger debate. The present section aims to clearly define its standpoint on 
the mind-brain debate for the reader and thus circumvent the philosophical questions within the mind-
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brain debate, that the thesis provides no adequate evidence to address. The thesis’ metatheoretical 
perspectives are twofold; i) of clearly delineating the types of reductionism uses, ii) distinguishing 
between different levels of analysis. 
The present author will argue that any discussion of mind-brain issue is similarly a discussion on the 
adequacies of reductionism (i.e., is the higher level of mind reducible to a lower level of neurons) 
(Franks, 2013,p.108). However, there are many meanings of reductionism, and so, any thorough 
analysis dealing with matters of the mind-brain issue, necessitates clarification on the types of 
reductionism(s) one is attempting to perform. According to Murphy (2003), there are at least five 
separate meanings of reductionism (Murphy, 2003,p.11f). 
 
1) Methodological reductionism; is a research strategy that separate complex systems into 
parts. This is exactly what analysis means and allows one to trace the relationship between 
interacting parts. 
2) Epistemological reductionism; holds that theories and laws of higher levels of science 
should be traced in causal terms to arise from the lower levels’ laws.  
3) Logical or Definitional reductionism; language referring to one type of entity can be 
translated without loss of the language about another type of entity. 
4) Causal reductionism: all causation is bottom up. Ultimately herein the parts of subatomic 
parts of the system determine all the parts on a higher level 
5) Ontological reductionism: Higher-level entities are seen as nothing but the sum of its part. 
As a consequence as we go up the levels, we need no new metaphysical entities 
(“ingredients”) added to higher levels from these lower level ones (e.g. no need for an 
immaterial mind to get consciousness).  
 
 
The present thesis deals with epistemological reductionism as it’s focal point where it discusses the 
extent of neurofeedback to investigate instances of mind-brain reductions. In during so, it has a special 
purpose in mind, which is the question of whether we through the extent of neurofeedback research 
to investigate mind-brain relationships have consequently satisfied a scientific causal account of a 
codetermining law between mind and brain (James, 1890,p.1-10). 
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The question of how the mind fits into our universe and whether or not “you are nothing but a pack 
of neurons” (Crick, 1995,p.3), or whether there is need for an expansion of natural ontology 
(Chalmers, 1995,p.1-17), is therefore left untouched by the present thesis. Here, the thesis carefully 
avoids the questions of why mind states have associated conscious experiences or “qualia” (ibid.). 
The core assumption of the thesis, is thus, that there is scientific value in discovering if one can 
epistemologically trace the causal relationships between higher levels of mind and lower levels of 
neural phenomena, even if one remains entirely agnostic about their base ontology. At times, the 
thesis may entertain questions regarding adequacies of causal and logical reductionism, however, the 
heart of the matter is whether epistemological reductionism in certain cases is possible when 
appealing to neurofeedback research. There are at least two positions regarding epistemological 
reductionism, that of constitutive reductionism and eliminative reductionism (Lilienfeld, 2007,p.3). 
Both of these positions acknowledge that higher level mental events are ultimately rooted in the 
activities of the nervous system (ibid.), i.e., they are “different aspects of the same process” (James, 
1890,p.136). Yet constitutive reductionism does not assume that the physiological level of analysis 
is always superior to and the only inevitable understanding of psychological events (Lilienfeld, 
2007,p.3). Dovetailing with this, the present author argues that in order to arrive at a comprehensive 
understanding of the potential of neurofeedback for addressing mind-brain causal relationships one 
must distinguish between differing levels of analysis. 
 
One influential framework for addressing the concept of levels of analysis in neuroscience was 
advanced by David Marr (Marr, 1982,p.1-25). Marr proposed three distinct levels of analysis (see 
Table 1), which he termed the implementational, algorithmic and the computational levels. The 
implementational level specifies the physical mechanisms which carry out this process, whereas the 
algorithmic level specifies the procedures by which this is to be carried out, while the higher 
computational level specifies the overall function that the cognitive system has to perform (Bechtel, 
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Critical for the present matter, is that for any cognitive process or mental state, be it neurofeedback 
itself or a mind-brain relationships that neurofeedback aims to investigate, the higher computational 
level affords a psychological interpretation (Lilienfeld, 2007,p.3-4). The appeal to a computational 
level of analysis is justified by the fact that the neurophysiological nomenclature gets one nowhere 
near the psychological phenomena to which an explanation is sought (Gavazzi, 2014). The levels are 
of course intimately linked, yet an analysis (or description) at one level does not satisfy as an 
explanation for another level (Marr, 1982,p.1-25; Overgaard and Mogensen, 2014,p.1-11). In other 
words, trying to understand a cognitive process while studying only neurons is by analogy like trying 
to understand bird flight by studying only feathers (i.e. highly unpractical) (Marr, 1982,p.25). 
Although, as argued by eliminative reductionism, such “epistemic gaps” may one day close 
(Chalmers, 2003,p.9; Lilienfeld, 2007,p.3-4). To summarize, the main cause of action for the thesis 
is to discuss what potential neurofeedback holds for identifying mind-brain causal relationships and 
as such. Lastly, the thesis is constrained in its scope on the matter at hand and therefore shows aspects 
of neurofeedback and the mind-brain causality debate in order to answer the problem statement. 
Accordingly, the reader should be aware, that many other examples and perspectives have carefully 
been deselected, due to the limiting scope of the thesis. 
 
Level of Analysis  Level Definition Neurofeedback Description 
   
Computational What is the goal of the computation? 
Why is it appropriate? 
 
 
What is the logic of the strategy by which 
it can be carried out? 
Self-regulation of brain activity. 
 
Due to an a priori association between the 
initial brain state and psychopathology or 
mental state. 
An attempt to induce specific mental states 
or clinically meaningful therapeutical gains 
Algorithmic How can this computational theory be 
implemented? What is the representation 
of the input and output? What is the 
algorithm for the transformation? 
Positive reinforcement the perturbations of 
the psychophysiological measurements that 
go towards the desired behaviour and 
negative reinforcement away from the 
undesired. 
 
Implementational How can the algorithm be physically 
realized? 
Biomedical devices measuring the 
psychophysiological processes. 
Table 1:  Marr’s three levels at which any cognitive system’s information processing must be understood in relation 
to an explanatory account of neurofeedback. Adapted from Marr (1982), p.25. The description of neurofeedback is 
meant as a tentative working definition of the cognitive process based on the following authors; (Fultz, 2002,p.1-3; 
Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.1-2; Ros et al., 2014,p.1; Strehl, 2014,p1-6; Sulzer et al., 2013,p.9) 
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into chapters beginning subsequent to this introductory chapter. In chapter two, 
several key principles underlying bio/neurofeedback is brought forth providing a necessary 
background for later discussions. The third chapter titled “Mind Over Chatter”, describes foremost 
the neurophysiological basis of electroencephalography (EEG) neurofeedback, along with its wide 
applied use for mental disorders and functions. Next, the chapter discusses two competing theoretical 
models of how neurofeedback exerts a causal effect on mind-brain relationships which is used to 
generate hypotheses within an empirical investigation of the neurophysiological underpinnings of 
language learning. Chapter four comprise a review of the several key features of the neurofeedback 
modality of real-time functional magnetic resonance imaging (rtfMRI) used in the subsequent 
chapter. In chapter five on “The Causal Explanatory Potential of Neurofeedback” the criteria required 
for causal inference in neuroscience are outlined. In facing up to the question of the explanatory 
potential of neurofeedback, this chapter presents several key advantages as well as limitations to 
inferring mind-brain causality through neurofeedback research in addition to discussing a new view 
on the potential of neurofeedback for causal inference. Chapter six integrates the points brought forth 
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2. Principles of Biofeedback 
 
2.1 Historical antecedents of Biofeedback 
There are most likely multiple historical trends that converged into the formation of 
bio/neurofeedback as a scientific discipline. However, one of the crucial factors was that of the 
meeting between western science and eastern philosophy (Walsh and Shapiro, 2006,p.1-7). The burst 
of excitement in the 1960s and 1970s for altered states of consciousness led researcher Elmer Green 
to bring the first portable electroencephalography (EEG) to India to measure a Buddhist yogi while 
he was meditating (Green & Green, 1977,p.197-207). It is estimated that expert meditators use more 
than 10.000-50.000 hours of meditation practice in order to achieve what contemplatives term ”being 
in the moment” or “one-pointed concentration” (Brewer et al., 2011,p.1; Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 
2007,p.1f), which is an amount of dedication that may seem daunting to most Westerners. If it was 
possible, through neurofeedback, to learn to induce this altered state of consciousness by inducing 
the corresponding neurophysiological state at will, the method could serve as a pragmatic “short-cut” 
(Brandmeyer and Delorme, 2013,p.1-4). The obvious question at this point, and one that is central to 
the thesis, is whether the neurophysiological state and the co-occurring state of consciousness is a bi-
product or epiphenomenon of each other (Chalmers, 2003,p.32-35). 
Concurrently Joseph Kamiya attempted to investigate the induction of a neurophysiological state and 
the associated mental state in his seminal papers on EEG operant conditioning, which would later be 
known as EEG biofeedback, Neurofeedback or Neurotherapy (Kamiya, 1962,p.6; Kamiya, 1969,p.1-
11; Frederick, 2012,p.1f). Kamiya asked whether participants could learn to discriminate when a 
particular frequency of brain waves called “alpha” was above a given threshold. He found that not 
only could participants learn to be aware of whether alpha power was high or low, but also to control 
alpha brain waves upon instruction (ibid.). 
A similar line of scientific inquiry that paved the way for the emergence of neurofeedback was Barry 
Sterman's NASA funded research into the toxicity of rocket fuel (Arns and Lyle, 2011,p.1; Sterman, 
2000,p.1-6). Rocket fuel contains toxic compounds that absorb essential co-enzymes for the synthesis 
of inhibitory neurotransmitters in the nervous system. Exposure of rocket fuel to an organism will 
therefore cause disinhibited movements and seizures. Using cats as subjects, Sterman found a clear 
dose-response relationship between the amount of administered rocket fuel and seizure 
symptomology, except for a subset of the cats that seemed to resist the propensity for seizures. By 
serendipity, Sterman had, in another study, conditioned this subset of  cats by administering and 
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withholding milk each time they increased or decreased the power of the sensory motor rhythm 
(SMR) of the EEG spectrum. What Sterman came to realize was that, through this blunder of standard 
scientific protocol, he had created an experimental model of cats that were highly resistant to seizures 
(ibid.). In the following years, Sterman translated this finding into a therapeutic setting by 
upregulating the SMR frequency band of a women suffering from epilepsy. The results were a 
reduction in epileptic seizures, providing the first evidence that neurofeedback could have therapeutic 
potential (Sterman and Friar, 1972,p.1-6; Sterman, 2000,p.1-6). The examples of Kamiya and 
Sterman are meant to illustrate the potential of bio/neurofeedback techniques for scientific inquiry 
and the development of novel therapeutic methods. What Kamiya set in motion is mirrored today in 
the current research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the use of neurofeedback in as a 
research tool in this context, something the thesis will deal more thoroughly with in the final chapter. 
Similarly, Sterman’s clinical approach also has widespread implications for future treatment, 
diagnosis and prevention of mental disorders, something that later chapters will explore. 
 
2.2 Zeitgeist of Neurofeedback 
To fully understand the scope of neurofeedback in its current form, one must appreciate the “zeitgeist” 
or the defining spirit that presently pervades the modern conception of mental health. For more than 
three decades, the biomedical model of mental health has been dominant within the western health 
care systems (Engel, 1977,p.1-7; Deacon, 2013,p.1ff). The biomedical model trivializes the influence 
of psychosocial factors and holds that mental disorders should be conceptualized as brain diseases or 
chemical imbalances (ibid.). It assumes an eliminative reductionist position to the relationship 
between mind and body which posits that psychological understandings are suboptimal momentary 
placeholders for a physiological understanding (Lilienfeld, 2007,p.2f).  
In the recent decade, the biomedical model has been challenged, most notably by the biopsychosocial 
model and its method of behavioral medicine, also known as integrative medicine or mind-body 
medicine (Engel, 1977,p.1-7; Kabat-Zinn, 1990,p.171-175; Simonsen and Mohl, 2010,p.36-45). This 
model expands beyond the biomedical to address the mind in addition to the body, behaviors, beliefs, 
thought and emotion, in addition to purely biological signs and symptoms. It shifts the orientation of 
the etiology of mental disorder from chemical imbalances in the brain to include the patients’ own 
perceptions and representations of the world around them. As an example of the contrast between the 
two models, the biopsychosocial model was able to explain how, given an exposure to the same 
disease agents and environmental conditions, some individuals would get sick and others not. The 
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model proposed that socio-psychological factors such as personal beliefs, attitudes and health 
behaviors plays a vital role in the person’s susceptibility to illnesses and mental disorders. Prima facie 
neurofeedback seems to support a biomedical model, it places emphasis on the role of biology in 
understanding and influencing mental disorders, and on the idea that treatment of brain processes 
yield psychological benefit (Gevensleben et al., 2014a,p.2). Yet, there are also authors who argue that 
neurofeedback can be subsumed under the paradigm of behavioral medicine and sustain that it is an 
inherently interdisciplinary field, attempting to bridge the gap between neurobiology and the 
cognitive sciences of the mind (Kirlangic and Ivanova, 2003,p.1-3; Nash, 2005,p.1-5). Similar to 
other behavioral medicine approaches such as cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and meditation 
based treatments, neurofeedback attributes a crucial role to human self-agency (Brenninkmeijer, 
2013,p.1-18; Kabat-Zinn, 1990,p.171; Ninaus et al., 2013,p.5-9; Yucha and Montgomery, 2008,p.1-
58). Neurofeedback highlights one of the core tenets of behavioral medicine: that humans indeed are 
more in control over their physiology than previously assumed (deCharms et al., 2005,p.1-5), and 
that this ability itself can be strengthened through training.  
 
2.3 Neuroplasticity  
The conventional approach among most early neuroscientists has been to adhere to the idea of 
“localizationism”, meaning that specific psychological functions correspond rigidly to a “hardwired” 
location in the brain, analogously to a computer (Doidge, 2007,p.6-116). However, a core theme 
emerged during the latest decades of neuroscientific research has been that the brain is not a 
preassembled and hardwired network of neurons, but instead changeable throughout life (Doidge, 
2007,p.1-10; Pinel, 2011,p.3; Giedd et al., 1999,p.1f; Mogensen, 2011,p.1-9) The term  for this 
feature is “neuroplasticity”, meaning  characteristics of the nervous system to be weak enough to 
yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at once (Doidge, 2007,p.1-10; James, 
1890,p.105). In the neuroscientific literature; “plasticity”, has become an umbrella-term to explain 
several facets of brains functioning such as learning and memory (Pinel, 2011,p.269-296). The brain’s 
potential of dynamically rearranging itself  also goes beyond everyday mental functioning and pays 
dividends as a crucial component of successful neurorehabilitation after brain injury (Mogensen, 
2011,p.1-3). Neurofeedback taps into the malleable nature of the brain. Neurofeedback measures the 
neurophysiological processes  and strives to change them towards a desired state and through 
neuroplasticity strengthens the ability of the system that mediated that change (Ros et al., 2010,p.1-
8). Moreover, the concept of transfer is deeply embedded into the aim of neurofeedback training. 
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Transfer, in this context, means that the successful regulation through neurofeedback resulted in a 
therapeutic effect that is maintained in the absence of feedback or in a different setting or non-trained 
task (Sulzer et al., 2013,p.3).  
 
2.4 Natural Born Cyborgs  
A similar underlying principle of neurofeedback stems from the brain’s extraordinary ability to 
autocorrect its responses to signals in the environment. One of the first indications that a hardwired 
view of the brain was incomplete came from Bach-y-Rita, a scientist and rehabilitation physician 
(Bach-Y-Rita et al., 1969,p.1f). In his article which appeared in the highly prestigious journal, Nature, 
Bach-Y-Rita described a device that would allow congenitally blind individuals to see. The device 
was a chair with a vibrating back that would relay electrical signals from a camera attached to the 
chair.  
 
Figure 2. Tactile television hardware constituting the vision substitution system. Adapted from (Bach-Y-Rita et al., 
1969,p.1f). 
This meant that the visual signal would be conveyed to the blind individual through the tactile sense 
and thus without the use of their eyes. The resolution of the signal was nowhere near that of the human 
eye, but it allowed blind individuals to “see” rudimentary contrasts and shapes. This “tactile vision 
device” came as a  novel input to the scientific consensus at the time and stood as one of the most 
iconic pieces of evidence for neuroplasticity. The device has since been advanced to become mobile 
such that blind individuals now receive the visual information from a thin metal plate on their tongue 
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(Bach-Y-Rita et al., 1969,p.1f; Doidge, 2007,p.34-38). A person wearing this device would be able 
to “see” with their tongue, i.e. having a genuinely visual perceptual experience without any 
“toungeness” to it (ibid.). A burgeoning literature has illustrated how the visual cortex is able process 
information relevant for its specialized processing regardless of the source (Kupers and Ptito, 
2004,p.1-5; Merabet and Pascual-Leone, 2010,p.1-7; Ptito et al., 2005,p.1-3) This is termed “sensory 
substitution” and is the ability of the brain to use information acquired by a sensory modality to 
perform a cognitive function which is normally fed by a different sensory modality (Ptito et al., 
2005,p.1-3). The visual cortex may be adeptly able to process visual information, yet it is of less 
importance where the sensors pick up the signal (Doidge, 2007,p.37f; Pinel, 2011,p.68). Although it 
may be debatable to which extent any given mental function or state is truly microdiscernable from 
another, it can be argued that at a coarse level of “granuality”, the function of “seeing” can be realized 
by multiple neural or even electronic substrates (Lindeløv, 2010,p.8-10; Overgaard and Mogensen, 
2011,p.1-4)  
The implication of these lines of evidence which are of prime relevance for neurofeedback is that the 
brain can adapt to any signals in the environment, whether they originate from biological or non-
biological sources. This has led philosopher of mind Andy Clark to argue that humans are “natural 
born cyborgs”, in the sense that the brain can transparently interface readily with electronic devices, 
just as it transparently interfaces with the peripheral nervous system (Clark, 2001,p.1-10). The 
findings of Bach-Y-Rita’s “tactile vision device” underlines that the brain is not restricted to 
biological input (Bach-Y-Rita et al., 1969,p.1f; Doidge, 2007,p.1-112; Merabet and Pascual-Leone, 
2010,p.1-7). Furthermore, it illustrates that these brain computer interfaces which are gaining 
momentum have the potential to restore vision for the blind (ibid.). This ability of the brain to attune 
to computer interfaces is a key component of neurofeedback. In much the same way as a person can 
learn to perceive visual signals through tactile sensations on the tongue, neurofeedback enables a 
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2.5 Feedback Loops  
The human body has an ability for self-regulation in order to appropriately maintain internal balance 
and order (Kabat-Zinn, 1982,p.144-146). Evolution has endowed our bodies with the autocorrective 
mechanisms able to adjust deviations for the sake of restoring homeostasis (Breedlove and Watson, 
2013,p.393-397). The body accomplishes this self-regulation through finely tuned feedback loops 
that operate on every level of the organism (Kabat-Zinn, 1982,p.144-146). For instance, when an 
individual performs a physical exercise, the heart will automatically pump more blood to provide 
sufficient oxygen, and will return to a normal level when the exercise is over (ibid.). 
The use of biomedical devices to monitor and influence physiological processes has traditionally been 
in use only in critical situations and by the hands of medical professionals. Perhaps the most familiar 
of all biofeedback devices is that of electrocardiography (ECG) used in modern hospitals (Pinel, 
2011,p.110). Imagine a doctor hearing the sound of an ECG machine beeping at  regular intervals 
indicating the heartbeat of the patient. In  case the doctor hears a flat lining of the ECG signal, a 
defibrillator is used in order to provide a brief electrical current to the patient’s heart muscles to 
reestablish normal cardiac rhythm (Kouwenhoven, 1969,p.1). At the moment when the doctor 
provides the current, he or she enters into a loop, where further perception of the sound of the ECG 
is now informed by the effects caused by the actions and inactions of the defibrillator. The example 
is critical in explaining that feedback is only ever present when the output of the system is routed or 
“fed” back to its own place of origin, such that future effects are informed by previous effects. The 
discrepancy with this analogy and biofeedback practice is that, in biofeedback, the rains of control 
are given to the individual and that they enforce the loop themselves. Self-regulation of physiological 
processes such as heart function is a documented human ability, yet by advancing our technical 
practices humans have made it possibly to outsource physiological regulation to biomedical devices 
(Cavazza et al., 2014,p.1-7; Sapolsky, 1994,p.1-33) 
 
2.6 Psychological Biography 
From ancient philosophy to the modern cognitive neuroscience, it has been a human goal to “know 
thyself” (deCharms, 2008,p.1; Wilson, 2009,p.1). Through neurofeedback it is now possible to access 
both mind and brain through subjective interception and external measurements of one’s brain 
simultaneously. Indeed, neurofeedback could be termed “interoneuroimaging” and presents itself as 
a promising tool for enhancing self-knowledge (ibid.). There is a sense in which neurofeedback as a 
psychological technical practice acts both as a literal and a symbolic biography for the subject. The 
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rather unique characteristic of neurofeedback is the “loopiness” of the process, whereby the attempts 
at self-regulation is met by immediate feedback based on its success or failure. In daily life, the typical 
attempts to self-regulate one’s physiology are often unguided and it thus remains uncertain whether 
these self-regulatory attempts are fruitful or not.  
 
Compared to traditional self-regulation, neurofeedback allows individuals to regulate physiological 
processes based on measures achieved through high-level computational algorithms that are naturally 
outside one’s immediate awareness and control (Ramirez et al., 2001,p.1; Strehl, 2014,p.1). It is of 
cause the very intriguing quality of science and technology to discover measurable phenomena in the 
world that were previously unknown. As Karl Marx wrote; ”All science would be superfluous if the 
outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided” (Marx, 1981,p.570). Indeed, our 
brains often  produce a very coarse version of our world (LeDoux, 1995,p.5), and it is therefore  the 
role of science and technology to extend the scope of the human senses and uncover the hidden layers 
of complexity in the universe. The telescope had the goal of extending the human eye, the telephone 
that of the human voice and a camera that of memory of visual scenes. Neurofeedback is equally 
another method for extending the human view of the world, yet it is unique in that it extends our view 


















3. Mind Over Chatter 
Frank H. Duffy, M.D., Professor and Pediatric Neurologist at Harvard Medical School, stated in an 
issue of the journal Clinical Electroencephalography that neurofeedback should play a major role in 
the treatment of mental illnesses (Duffy, 2000 from Hammond, 2011,p.1). "In my opinion, if any 
medication had demonstrated such a wide spectrum of efficacy it would be universally accepted and 
widely used", "It is a field to be taken seriously by all" (ibid.). The present chapter will provide an 
account of electroenchalography (EEG) neurofeedback, on an implementational, algorithmic and 
computational level of analysis. In doing so, the chapter will feature a brief neurophysiological 
explanation of EEG as well as the procedures and rationale for practicing EEG neurofeedback. 
Moreover, the chapter will provide a synthesized systematic review of the wide spectrum of EEG 
neurofeedback research literature on the treatment of mental disorders. Here, questions regarding the 
amount of published study-articles and individual research dedicated to a given mental disorder will 
be addressed. The chapter will present the two competing theoretical models regarding 
neurofeedback, that of the “conditioning-and-repair” and the “skill-acquisition” model. To fully 
delineate the two competing models the present chapter will present experimental evidence 
suggesting district neurophysiological profiles of language learning abilities. Concluding the chapter, 
two models will be used to generate hypotheses for a future neurofeedback research project. 
3.1 The Basis of EEG Neurofeedback 
The acronym EEG is short for electroencephalography, which means the graphical reading of the 
electrical activity arising from the encephalon or “within the head”. (Pinel, 2011,p.64; Saab, 
2008,p.1). It’s instructive to begin at the basic level, which is that of individual excitatory (E) and 
inhibitory (I) neurons organized in a six-layered cortical structure (Collura, 1990,p.1-3; Ros et al., 
2014,p.1-10). When E-neurons produce action potentials they activate the I-neurons, which later 
retroactively silence the E-neurons, and so ad perpetuum. Ultimately, this inhibitory recurrent 
feedback mechanism prevents an overabundance of excitation and ensures that the cortex has a 
manageable level of activity, which is necessary for adequate information processing. It is the 
combined activity of these E-I neuronal assemblies that, when scaled-up to the staggering web of 
billions of neurons in the cortex, contributes to brain oscillations or “brain waves”. How quickly the 
wave cycles shift between rising and falling determines their frequency, typically measured in cycles 
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per second or Hertz (Hz). The spectrum has traditionally been delineated in the following bands: delta 
(1-4 Hz), theta (4-7 Hz), alpha (7-12 Hz), beta (15-30) and gamma (> 30 Hz) (ibid.). 
 
Figure 3. Analysis of neurophysiology through electroencephalography (EEG) 
Left: Inhibitory and excitatory neurons organized in a six-layered cortex neurons produce signals measured at the scalp 
by electrodes Middle: 500 milliseconds of raw EEG data as measured by several individual electrodes Right: The 
oscillations can be classified in frequency bands δ: delta (1-4 Hz), θ: theta (4-7 Hz), α: alpha (7-12 Hz),  β: beta (15-
30) and γ: gamma (> 30 Hz). 
These electrophysiological characteristics are interconnected with a panoply of neurotransmitters that 
work at the synapse of the neuron (Lubar, 1997,p.2-6; Ros et al., 2014,p.2-4). In parallel, the activity 
of these processes reciprocally determines the cerebral metabolic processes in addition to the 
neuroplastic changes of local and connective brain tissue  (Ghaziri et al., 2013,p.1; Ros et al., 
2013,p.1-10, 2010,p.1-8; Başar et al., 2000,p.1-2; Pfurtscheller and Lopes, 1999,p.1-5). These 
oscillatory electrophysiological processes interconnect with all brain processes, and they have thus 
implications for neuropsychological processes and the higher psychological level of analysis (ibid.). 
Historically, EEG patterns were shown to correspond to psychological levels of arousal, from sleep 
to wakefulness to high alertness (Ros et al., 2014,p.2). Since their discovery, the scientific 
investigation of electrophysiological brain characteristics have been shown to correspond with 
several cognitive functions, such as attention, emotion, memory and consciousness (Andreassi, 
2013,p.122-143; Polich and Kok, 1995,p.1-34; Ros et al., 2014,4-16; Seth et al., 2008,p.5). These 
functions are mediated by neuronal synchronization of different frequency bands allowing transient 
functional integration of neural assemblies (Ros et al., 2014,p.4; Varela et al., 2001,p.1-9). The 
communicative exchange of information between neurons is similar to the way a radio picks up on a 
frequency of a particular radio station (ibid.). As such, the transfer of information between neurons 
(listeners and radio stations) becomes optimal when their frequencies are more prominent and when 
irrelevant signals (chatter) from other neurons (radio stations) are reduced (Arce-McShane et al., 
2016,p.1; Cardin et al., 2009,p.1-4). 
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It’s important to realize that these frequencies occur simultaneously in the brain, however with 
different amplitudes. Studies have established that the amplitude of these individual frequencies often 
referred to as the power of the frequency,  is related to the number of neural assemblies firing at that 
particular frequency along with the phase-locking (synchronization) of their firing (Ros et al., 
2014,p.2). A useful metaphor is to compare these to “standing-waves” generated by a crowd of 
spectators in a stadium. The amplitude of the frequency is the “agreeableness” of the spectators to 
contribute to that particular wave cycle in synchrony with others (ibid.). As a general principle, low 
frequencies integrate information globally  in the brain whereas high-frequency oscillations integrate 
information at local neural assemblies (Bagdasaryan and Le Van Quyen, 2013,p.4-7). At this point, 
due to the specific progression of this description, the reader may be led to conclude that the causal 
relationship only goes one way and that activity at local assemblies unidirectionally determines global 
oscillations. Contrary to this assumption, slower large scale cortical oscillations can, in a top-down 
manner, entrain faster local oscillations, a process known as cross-frequency coupling. Supporting 
this view, several lines of evidence highlight the bi-directional nature of global and local oscillatory 
activity  (Canolty and Knight, 2012,p.1-4; Canolty et al., 2009,p.1; Bagdasaryan and Le Van Quyen, 
2013,p.4-7). For brevity, in the context of the standing-wave analogy, a bi-directional causal 
relationships would mean that the crowd of spectators could influence the behaviour of the individual 
and also reverse.  
 
Supporting the conception of pathological oscillations are findings of stable oscillations of one kind 
in neurologically healthy populations and relatively consistent, different EEG patterns associated with 
mental disorders (Duff, 2004,p.1-5; Ros et al., 2014,p.5-10). The research on EEG correlations with 
neurological, neuropsychiatric, and neuropsychological disorders is extensive and the following 
represents only a subset of this vast literature. For instance, the core symptoms of post-concussion 
syndrome includes  attention and mood disorders, impulsivity, memory difficulties and headaches. 
Each of which are associated with EEG oscillations, most prominently excessive slow waves (e.g., 
theta 4-7 Hz) (ibid.). The same neurophysiological pattern is seen in attentional deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD),  showing excessive theta (see Figure 4), in an addition to improvement if ADHD 
symptomology through upregulating beta or alpha compared to theta (Doppelmayr and Weber, 
2011,p.1-14; Martijn Arns et al., 2009,p.1-2; Duff, 2004,p.1-5; Ros et al., 2014,p.5-10).     
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Figure 4. Absolute Power Z score of ADHD Adolescents  
The figure shows the power Z score of ADHD with comparison to a standardized database of neurologically healthy 
adolescents (Collura, 1990,p.1-6), within the five different frequency bands δ: delta (1-4 Hz), θ: theta (4-7 Hz), α: 
alpha (7-12 Hz),  β: beta (15-30) and γ: gamma (> 30 Hz). The regions that are more red correspond to a higher 
amplitude or power within the corresponding frequency band for adolescents suffering from ADHD as compared with 
neurologically healthy adolescents. The top right legend shows the colour for the corresponding Z score. 
 
In anxiety disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a decrease in the alpha rhythm 
has likewise been observed, possibly reflecting hyperarousal (Moore, 2000,p.1; Ros et al., 2014,p.5; 
Wahbeh and Oken, 2013,p.1). In contrasts, disorders such as substance use disorders (SUD) and 
schizophrenia are characterised by abnormalities in the faster beta and gamma frequencies (Ros et 
al., 2014,p.5; Sokhadze et al., 2008,p.1-22; Sürmeli et al., 2011,p.1-3). A robust finding in patients 
with depression is asymmetrical prefrontal activity, highlighting the importance of regional 
specificity and relative frequency in defining clinical EEG abnormalities (Davidson, 1998,p.1-10, 
1992,p.1-4; Hammond, 2005,p.1-3). Moreover, as documented by Bauer (2001) within SUD, baseline 
EEG beta power was found to be a superior predictor of relapse after a 6 month period, as compared 
to psychological factors measured through a large battery of neuropsychological tests (Bauer,p.1-9, 
2001; Ros et al., 2014,p.5). Specifically, it was shown that beta power improved the predictive 
accuracy of the model from 56 % to 74 % and significantly outweighing other predictors (ibid.). 
Importantly, EEG characteristics associated with a particular pathology can be used as a biomarker 
for prognosis, e.g. in the case of long-term recovery perspectives from ischemic stroke, where delta 
(1-4 Hz) inversely correlates with perfusion in the lesioned substrate. Similarly, administration of 
psychostimulants leading to successful outcomes in disorders such as Parkinson’s disorder and 
ADHD also correspond to a normalization of EEG activity (ibid.).  
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The traditional approach of neurofeedback used by Kamiya and Sterman, was to teach self-regulation 
by intentionally up- or down-regulating the amplitude of a particular frequency (Cantor and 
Evans,p.19-49, 2014; Collura, 1990,p.1-6; Egner and Sterman, 2006,p.1-6; Krigbaum and Wigton, 
2014,p.1-7; Ros et al., 2014,p.5-10; Vernon et al., 2003,p.1-4). The particular frequency was 
determined based on prior research literature indicating a plausible association between this 
frequency and a mental function or dysfunction. A fundamental limitation of this approach is that 
mental functions and dysfunctions are not necessarily neurobiologically homogenous (Lindeløv, 
2015,p.7f; Ros et al., 2014,p.6). In short, psychologically defined constructs based on similar 
behavioural patterns can arise from dissimilar neural substrates (ibid.). Recently, sophisticated 
metrics such as frequency power ratios, Z-score neurofeedback, hemispheric synchrony, and phase-
lag neurofeedback have been developed in response to these challenges, allowing to address a broader 
range of neuronal dynamics (Krigbaum and Wigton, 2014,p.1-7; Ros et al., 2014,p.6). 
 
Stating it in the terms of Marr’s three levels, the representation of the input and the algorithm for the 
transformation has shifted with the change of the technological landscape in the last decades. The 
basic model on the computational level, however, remains the same, namely the association between 
a measurement of physiological activity and psychopathology and the subsequent attempt to shift this 
activity. This model means that in relation to any mental disorder, neurofeedback research aims at 
targeting the associated neurophysiology and at testing whether it results in clinically meaningful 
improvement. Thus, neurofeedback is a not just a treatment option for some mental disorders, but a 
multifaceted treatment approach with implications for a wide spectrum of mental disorders (Duffy, 
2000,p.1). In the following section, the question of  the spectrum neurofeedback research will be 
addressed, focusing on the amount of research conducted  on different mental functions and 
dysfunctions. 
 
3.2 The Wide Spectrum: a Systematic Review of the literature 
3.2.1 Systematic Review Background 
Presently, several systematic reviews and meta-analyses of neurofeedback exist. However, such 
reviews restrict their focus to a single pathological condition or mental disorder such as Epilepsy or 
ADHD (Arns et al., 2009,p.1; J. Gruzelier, 2014,p.1; Tan et al., 2009,p.1). In a comprehensive 
bibliography, the International Society for NFB & Research (ISNR) found 629 articles published in 
scholarly, peer-reviewed journals that discuss or utilize biofeedback (Hammond and Novian, 
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2013,p.1). Here, the present author undertook a systematic review of study-articles on EEG 
neurofeedback in order to expand upon the ISNR bibliography in order to address the trend of studies 
on different mental functions and dysfunctions, taking year and quality into account. 
3.2.2 Search Strategy and Screening 
A broad search of English-language literature using a range of search terms (for details see appendix 
1), restricted to the years between 1999 to 2015 was performed using Google Scholar (GS). The 
search terms were tailored to have high sensitivity to the previously mentioned bibliography 
(Hammond and Novian, 2013,p.1). Commercial articles were excluded. The mental disorder or 
phenomenon that the articles aimed at treating or training was classified. Several subtypes of disorders 
belonging to a broader class of disorders were collapsed into a single mental disorder or phenomenon 
(see Table 2).  
Mental Disorder/Phenomenon Subtypes 
  
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) 
ADD, Hyperkinetic/Hyperactivity disorder, Impulsivity and Inattention. 
Early Onset Behav/Emo Disorders (F91-
F98) 
Delinquent Behaviour, Criminal behaviour, Criminality, Juvenile Offenders, 
Conduct Disorder, Tic and Tourette Syndrome, Reactive Attachment Disorder, 
Attachment Disorder, Neglect, Dissociative Identity Disorder, Somatoform 
Disorder 
Cognitive Enhancement Working memory, Executive Function, 
Musical/Creativity/Artistic abilities,  
Auditory / Visual Discrimination Tasks in Healthy Volunteers. 
Trainability of absolute, relative, ratio EEG frequencies. Testing different stimuli, 
contingency awareness, predictors of successful learning etc. 
Age Related Cognitive Decline and 
Neurodegenerative Disease (ARCD and 
NDD) 
Cognitive Enhancement with focus on the Elderly.  
Dementia, Parkinson’s Disease, Alzheimer’s, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis. 
Pain and Headache Chronic Pain, Fibromyalgia, Pain Management, Headache and Migraine, 
Peripheral Neuritis 
Substance Abuse Addiction, Drug Addiction, Psychostimulant Use, Alcohol/Cocaine/Nicotine 
Dependence 
Eating Disorder Bulimia Nervosa, Disinhibited Eating Pattern, Childhood Obesity 
Affective Disorder (F30-F39) Bipolar/Mood Disorder, Anger Disorder, Mild, Severe and Treatment Resistant 
Depression 
Learning Disability Dyslexia, Reading Disorder, Dysgraphia, Agraphia, Intellectual disorder, Spelling 
Disability, Cognitive Impairment & Mild Cognitive Impairment 
Sleep / Insomnia Sleep Disorder and Insomnia, periodic limb movements in Sleep 
Subjective Experience Consciousness, Altered States, Meditation, Wellbeing, Phenomenology, 
Immersion. 
Brain Injury (TBI and CVA) Traumatic Brain Injury, Cerebrovascular Accidents, Ischemia, Stroke, 
Hemorrhage, Hematoma, Cerebral Palsy, Myocardiac Infarction. 
Balance Disorders Balance Disorder, Ménère’s Disease, Gait. 
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An attempt was made to classify sub-disorders into the larger mental, behavioural and 
neurodevelopmental disorders in  ICD10 (WHO, 1992,p.91-228), such as the Affective Disorders 
(F30-F39) and the Stress-Related Disorders (F40-49). However, ADHD was for emphasis separated 
from the usual categorization into behavioural and emotional disorders with onset usually occurring 
in childhood and adolescence (F90-98). Study articles addressing multiple disorders (e.g. Comorbid 
Insomnia with Affective Disorder) and where participants fulfilled both diagnostic criteria, were 
counted for each disorder (ibid.). The type of article such as “Research Study”, “Book”, “Review”, 
“Methods” article sample size (N) in the case of a “Research Study”, information on whether the 
study featured a control group (between-group or crossover design). For inclusion in the subset of 
studies, the screened articles had to report on a research study using neurofeedback compared against 
a control or placebo group (including those that compared neurofeedback to a pharmacological 
alternative) and using more than 9 subjects in total.  
 
3.2.3 Results 
From the pool of 1082 screened articles, 771 investigated the effectiveness of neurofeedback for 
training or treating a specific mental function or dysfunction (See Figure 5 top pane). To address the 
annual frequency of controlled studies from the 771 articles were a subset was created conditioned 
on being a “Research Study” (581) that utilized a controlled design (254), dealing with EEG 
neurofeedback and having a sample size N >= 9 (227) (Figure 5 bottom pane). For a detailed 
overview of the reviewed articles, the database is made freely available1.  
 
                                                          
1The Database is available at the following webpage: (https://osf.io/vuj7z/ ). 
Stress/Anxiety-Related Disorders (F40-49) Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Trauma, Sexual Abuse, Refugee Trauma, 
Stress Management, Hypertension, Contamination Anxiety, Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder (OCD), Anxiety, Generalized Anxiety, Performance Anxiety, 
Autism and Asperger’s Autism, Autistic Spectrum Disorder, Asperger’s, Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder, 
Other / Unspecified Speech Impairment, Swallowing, Restless Leg Syndrome, HIV, Gastrointestinal 
Disorder, Functional Pregnancy Disturbances, Down Syndrome, Diabetes, Chronic 
Fatigue, Anosmia, Organic Cognitive Disorder, Premenstrual Syndrome, 
Unspecified Personality Disorders 
Table 2: Mental Disorders and Phenomenon types and subtypes 
Left Column: Indicating the Mental Disorder or Phenomena that the study was classified as addressing. Right Column: the 
subtypes  of disorders or phenomena belonging to the main disorder. Disorders without subtypes: Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and 
Mental Retardation, Schizophrenia, Epilepsy, Mental and Motor Imagery 
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Figure 5. Annual Journal Publications & Controlled Studies in Neurofeedback. 
Top Pane: Shows a stacked bar plot of the acquired articles (n) for each year from 1999-2015 along with the specific 
disorder/mental phenomena in question. Bottom Pane: depicts the same time period in the subset of controlled 
neurofeedback studies (n) with N > 9. Colors for disorders are organized by the inverse of the total publications. FASD: 
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, ARCD and NDD: Age-Related Cognitive Decline and Neurodegenerative Diseases, TBI and 
CVA: Traumatic Brain Injury and Cerebrovascular Accident, ADHD: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.  
 
These results show that articles on neurofeedback for ADHD are the most frequently published 
throughout the years, with Cognitive Enhancement following it. Moreover, neurofeedback research 
is targeting disorders such as Stress/Anxiety-Related Disorders, Brain Injuries and Substance Abuse 
to a larger degree than a decade ago. Overall, the pattern shows that there is a nearly three-fold 
increase in articles over the past 10 years with 43 in 2005 compared to 139 in 2014. The controlled 
studies also show an increase with an average of 4.3 controlled studies in the initial 99-06 years 
whereas 2014 alone featured 54 studies. 
3.2.4 Systematic Review Findings 
Collectively, these data provide evidence that research within neurofeedback is increasing along with 
the quality of the studies performed in the form of utilizing control groups and higher sample sizes. 
This could be due to several factors such as popularity, technological innovation, inexpensiveness or 
scientific increases in scientific publications (Angelakis, 2012,p.1). Presently, there exists a 
controversy regarding the use of Google Scholar (GS) as an isolated tool for systematic reviews 
(Bramer et al., 2013,p.1; Giustini and Boulos, 2013,p.1). Moving forward, future systematic reviews 
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would benefit from using a multitude of databases including Google Scholar, MEDLINE, Cochrane 
Library, PubMed and Ovid/EMBASE to avoid the limitations of searching with a single database. 
Future research could also look into the differing types of control such as passive, sham, quasi-active 
and active control group and the effect-sizes for neurofeedback in those instances. Furthermore, an 
investigation of the different metrics used in the neurofeedback protocol, such as frequency power 
ratios, hemispheric synchrony, and phase-lag could be taken into account. This could ultimately lead 
to a comprehensive review and meta-analysis for neurofeedback within the different mental functions 
and dysfunctions. The review is both preliminary and superficial in nature, as primarily only reading 
of abstracts was performed; it is however comprehensive in the number of articles reviewed. Future 
systematic reviews, bibliometric- and meta-analyses are needed for the investigation into the 
usefulness of neurofeedback as a therapeutical option. 
 
3.3 Models of the Effects of Neurofeedback 
3.3.1 Conceptual confusion 
 
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a ‘young science’; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for 
instance in its beginnings… 
For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. 
-Wittgenstein, 1953, Philosophical Investigations, Sec. II, p. 232 
 
The famous statement by Wittgenstein written over 50 years ago is acknowledged as forecasting the 
present psychological discipline (Hutto, 2009,p.1-15). It can be argued that the conceptual confusion 
is especially applicable to a conceptual understanding of neurofeedback. Without a clear theoretical 
backdrop, it is often difficult to create a body of knowledge that will constructively foster the 
deduction of empirical testable hypotheses to either support or refute components of that theory 
(Hobfoll, 1989,p.1). As stated by Kurt Lewin, “There is nothing as practical as a good theory” (ibid.). 
Thus, a certain balance between empirical data and conceptual theory is  required, as concepts without 
facts are hollow, so one could equally argue that facts without concepts are meaningless (Novella, 
2016). This section presents two prototypical models of explanations as to the working mechanism 
of neurofeedback (Gevensleben et al., 2014a,p.1-9; Nash, 2005,p.2). These can briefly be described 
as the “conditioning-and-repair” and the “skill-acquisition” model of neurofeedback effects. As will 
be discussed below, these competing models have different explanatory power, and posit different 
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arguments regarding  the potential of neurofeedback for informing about mind-brain causal 
relationships.  
Several authors argue that an adequate conceptualization and explanatory model of neurofeedback 
has generally eluded the investigation of the method (Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.2; Kirlangic and 
Ivanova, 2003,p.1; Meichenbaum, 1976,p.1-12; Nash, 2005,p.2; Ninaus et al., 2013,p.1-9; Strehl, 
2014,p.1-6; Witte et al., 2013,p1-6; Wood et al., 2014a,p.1-3; Brenninkmeijer, 2013,p.1-18). The 
diverging explanatory models carry with them different assumptions regarding the etiology of the 
mental disorder and the underlying causality of neuronal and psychological mechanisms of 
neurofeedback. In addition the models hold different positions on the moderating and mediating 
factors of the neurofeedback training (e.g., what is the outcome of neurofeedback and how does it 
transfer to a real life situations?). Furthermore, different opinions may change the interpretation of 
the clinical efficacy of neurofeedback (ibid.). As an example, Arns and Strehl (2013) and Sonuga-
Barke et al (2013) both review the literature on neurofeedback as a treatment option for ADHD using 
different explanatory models coming to a favourable and dismissive evaluation of neurofeedback 
respectively (Arns and Strehl, 2013,p.1-2; Sonuga-Barke et al., 2013,p.1-4; Gevensleben et al., 
2014,p.1-2). The present section of the thesis will  present the “conditioning-and-repair” and the 
“skill-acquisition” model of neurofeedback. Reflecting on their explanatory power, the extent to 
which the models show that neurofeedback informs of mind-brain causal relationships will be 
illustrated. Concluding the chapter, the models will be applied to a hypothesis regarding a future 
neurofeedback study on language learning abilities.  
 
3.3.2 The conditioning-and-repair model 
The “conditioning-and-repair” model represents the traditional approach according to which 
neurofeedback effects mind-brain causal relationships (Gevensleben et al., 2014b,p.1-9; Nash, 
2005,p.2). The fundamental assumption of the model is that the etiology of the mental disorder is due 
to an underlying neuronal deficit and that the mode of action for neurofeedback is to “repair” the 
deficit. The model would predict that brain state is highly specific to the mental disorder and that only 
protocol-specific neurofeedback for the given brain state can and for the brain state to strongly 
correlate to mental improvement. The model assumes, inter alia, a classical biomedical model and a 
strict causal relationship from brain to mind. One of the core mechanisms underlying both etiology 
and alleviation of the symptoms according to the conditioning-and-repair model is that an underlying 
brain “trait” is causing the maladaptive mental disorder unidirectionally. The model holds that the 
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brain’s electrophysiological and metabolic traits correspond to the individual’s mental state and that 
neurofeedback provides stable change of that trait.  
“Monkeys meditate for marshmallows” was the headline in the NewScientist report by Philippens 
and Vanwersch, who, inspired by Stermans initial findings, had trained monkeys to increase their 
sensorimotor rhythm and given them marshmallows as rewards (Strehl, 2014,p.1). The argument, 
being in resonance with the conditioning-and-repair model, is that if animals can learn to do it without 
explicit instruction, the process of neurofeedback largely involves implicit (unconscious and 
automatic) processes. According to the law of parsimony it would be unnecessary to postulate higher 
mental and psychological functions to the processes of neurofeedback (Morgan, 1894,p.53 from 
Lindeløv, 2015,p.11; Fultz, 2009,p.1-3). In this conditioning-and-repair view of neurofeedback the 
processes is compared to motor learning and no higher order-cognitive processes are necessarily 
involved (Gevensleben et al., 2014a,p.4-7). The view reflects what can be termed a neo-behaviourist2 
stance of locating the specific brain abnormality and applying operant conditioning until the brain’s 
“behaviour” is restored to normal, followed by the receding of the mental disorder. According to the 
“conditioning-and-repair” model, transfer should occur automatically: “[…] when brain behaviour is 
normalized, the child’s behaviour follows”(Steinberg and Othmer, 2004,p.35 from Gevensleben et 
al., 2014,p.3). The transfer or generalization of the effect to daily life happens by itself without a 
necessary context dependence between the training and the use of the training. In this regard, the 
treatment is similar to pharmacology, and explanations of neurofeedback using this model in fact 
often attributes its causal efficacy in relieving mental disorders to similar mechanisms as 
psychopharmacology (Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.2-7; Niv, 2013,p.1).  
In terms of evidence supporting the model, there have been instances of protocol-specific effects of 
neurofeedback such as lasting neurophysiological and improved behavioural effects after training of 
the particular neuronal dysfunction (Monastra et al., 2001,p.1-8) and functional specificity (i.e., 
double dissociation) of trained spectral bands (Gruzelier, 2014b,p.1-3). There is furthermore evidence 
that suggests that baseline EEG activity is related to outcome, supporting the notion that “worst cases” 
improve the most, and that a more pronounced initial neural deficit has a larger potential for 
improvement on a neurophysiological and psychological level (Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.6, 
2009,p.1).  In general, the evidence for brain trait in the case of EEG is lacking, as the physiological 
profile appears to be state-dependent (Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.6; Ros et al., 2014,p.4). For 
                                                          
2 Neo-behaviourism because a strict behaviourist interpretation would present a conundrum, since neurofeedback relies 
on neural components underlying behaviour moving the subject matter into the brain rather than on external factors of 
stimulus and response which behaviourism typically has as its focus (Bechtel, 1994,p.2; Fultz, 2009,p.1-3, 2002,p.1). 
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example, the oscillatory profiles of ADHD and healthy subjects manifest themselves  differently, if 
at all, depending on the attentional task administered (ibid.).  It may be the case that stable EEG 
changes are only present after abundant training, as it is seen with long-term practitioners of 
meditation (10.000-50.000h) who show enhanced baseline gamma activity (Gevensleben et al., 
2014,p.6;Lutz et al., 2004,p.1). The conditioning and repair model can thus be summarized as 
targeting a specific underlying neuronal deficit, which is repaired through protocol-specific operant 
conditioning of the brain assuming a strict unidirectional causal relationship from brain to mind. 
3.3.3 The skill-acquisition model 
The “skill-acquisition model” also known as the “neuroflexibility” model invokes homeostatic 
mechanisms and flexibility of nervous system as the explanatory mechanism of neurofeedback 
(Buckelew et al., 2013,p.1, 2009,p.1; Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.1-9; Nash, 2005,p.2). In contrast to 
the “conditioning-and-repair model”, in this alternative model, neurofeedback doesn’t just 
recondition a specific neuronal deficit,  but teaches the individual the skill of avoiding “being stuck“ 
in any maladaptive mind-brain state. In fact, for achieving a therapeutic effect with neurofeedback, 
some authors make the analogy of “rocking” the brain electrophysiology back and forth as one would 
“rock” a stuck automobile to get out of a snowdrift or mud (Clarke, 2014,p.14). It reflects a certain 
skill of being able to adjust cortical activation consistent with environmental demands, or 
“neuroflexibility” (Buckelew et al., 2013,p.1, 2009,p.1; Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.1-9; Nash, 
2005,p.2). The “skill-acquisition model” is based on the biopsychosocial model and thus takes into 
account the psychological factors in increasing the likelihood of transferring the skill to other 
instances (ibid.). Thus, it aligns with a view on mind-brain causality where cognitive-behavioural and 
neurophysiological levels represent two sides of the same coin, and the treatment is targeted from 
both directions (Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.1-9; Kurthen, 2010,p.3-11; Lilienfeld, 2007,p.3). The 
causal explanatory account is thus one that acknowledges the psychological level of explanation in 
addition to the neurobiological and sees the effects of the training as moderated and mediated by 
cognitive factors (Meichenbaum, 1976,p.1-3). In other words, the factors such as the individuals 
perceptions, attributions, appraisals or his or her internal dialogue about the ability to control the 
physiological response(ibid.). The “skill-acquisition-model” emphasizes that the mechanism of  
learning in neurofeedback is controlled, effortful and enhanced through explicit understanding. The 
model would predict that generalization of the skill to real-life situations would require voluntary 
effort to achieve (ibid.). Supporting evidence for the skill-acquisition model are instances where 
neurofeedback targeting specific frequencies results in changes during training, or results in 
behavioural improvement but not in changes of EEG characteristics (Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.6; 
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Santarpia, 2008,p.1). One of the strongest pieces of evidence that substantiates the notion of 
neuroflexibility is provided by Kluetsch et al., (2014), who down-regulated alpha brain waves as 
opposed to traditional upregulation in a group of individuals diagnosed with PTSD (Kluetsch et al., 
2014,p.1-11). The authors found that during training, the alpha became desynchronized but was 
followed by a significant “rebound” effect of increasing alpha which was positively correlated with 
subjective ratings of calmness. The neuroflexibility model is often applied in neurofeedback research 
into insomnia and sleep related problems, where the hypothesis is that sleep disturbances arise due to 
the an inability to transition between sleep stages (Arns and Kenemans, 2014,p.4-11; Buckelew et al., 
2013,p.1, 2009,p.1). A notable challenge to the rivalling conditioning-and-repair model is the 
generally low consensus  as to how to reinforce specific EEG frequencies. Johnson and Bodenhamer-
Davis (2009) confronted 13 neurofeedback practitioners (i.e., neurotherapists) with sample clinical 
cases where the practitioners had to indicate the treatment they would recommend for the given case 
(Johnson and Bodenhamer-Davis, 2009,p.1). The respondents generally agreed on which brain 
regions and brain frequencies to train but diverged on their opinions on how to reinforce (down/up-
regulate)  according to theoretical rationales. This is all to state that neurofeedback might not work 
by changing towards something specific, but instead through change per se and learning to self-
regulate this skill in other situations (Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.1-9; Ros et al., 2014,p.1-16). Several 
authors conceptualize the working mechanism of neurofeedback as “nudging” the brain in the right 
direction and as such dovetailing with the skill-acquisition model (Baehr, 2009,p.2; Clarke, 
2014,p.14; Hammond, 2007,p.2; Larsen et al., 2006,p.3; Ochs, 2006,p.27). The assumption is that 
neurofeedback facilitates learning of self-regulation in small incremental steps, which the brain then 
generalizes to use in all self-regulation of its internal dynamics (ibid.). A counter-argument from a 
conditioning-and-repair model point of view could be the concept of neuronal hydraulics, which 
states that changing the system without holding sufficient variables equal allows the system to find 
other outlets of expressing dysregulation (Collura, 1990,p.4). The way of conceptualizing 
neurofeedback as “nudging” the brain in the right direction seems to coincide with the description of 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (Perry and Lupyan, 2014,p.2; Reinhart and Woodman, 
2015,p.2; Sanders, 2014,p.2) Using tDCS allows therapists and researchers to manipulate the 
membrane potential of neurons which doesn’t lead to action potentials directly, but changes the 
probability of action potentials. As such, neurofeedback and tDCS could be collectively referred to 
as neurotherapeutic techniques that do not directly cause a particular brain state but rather facilitate 
or moderate the brain’s own ability to achieve the state in question.  
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Following the prediction of the “skill-acquisition model”, several findings support the notion that 
neurofeedback learning may be mediated and modulated by neuropsychological dispositions prior to 
training and that these may influence how successfully neurofeedback is learned (Konareva, 2006,p.1, 
2005,p.1). Variables like outcome expectation, self-efficacy, achievement, motivation, or locus of 
control are assumed to be basic modulators of treatment (Borkovec and Sibrava, 2005,p.1; 
Gevensleben et al., 2012,p.1-7). Keeping in mind that changes of cognitive-behavioural and social 
variables, are also reflected in changes of  the underlying neural networks the “skill-acquisition 
model” sees these former cognitive factors as equally important to consider when discussing the effect 
of neurofeedback (ibid.). It has been shown that motivation and attitude towards mastery of the skill 
correlate positively with increased neurofeedback performance (Nijboer et al., 2010). It has also been 
shown that attempting to regulate brain activity increases neural activity in networks involved in 
cognitive control (Ninaus et al., 2013). In addition, neurophysiological measures of  executive 
function have also been shown to significantly predict performance (Doppelmayr and Weber, 
2011,p.1-12; Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2014,p.1-4; Ferreira and Dias, 2012,p.1; Knezevic et al., 
2010,p.1; Strehl et al., 2005,p.1-6; Siniatchkin et al., 2000,p.1). The stance of the “skill-acquisition 
model” is that neurofeedback may ameliorate not only the particular neural dysfunction of interest 
but also encompasses mechanisms on the cognitive-behavioural and social level, which are reflected 
in underlying neural networks. In other words, neurofeedback promotes reinforcement of 
compensatory mechanisms on higher interacting levels.  
Evidence suggesting that neurofeedback is similar to learning a skill through explicit and controlled 
cognitive processing lies for example in the original findings by Kamiya (1962,1969) replicated by 
Frederick (2012), showing that explicit discrimination of alpha brainwaves generalized to voluntary 
control (Kamiya, 1962,p.6; Kamiya, 1969,p.1-11; Frederick, 2012,p.1-21).This indicates that explicit 
awareness and discriminatory ability of one’s own brain state is somehow fundamentally liked to 
self-regulation of it (ibid.). The  “skill-acquisition-model” does not assume that generalization is 
ensured automatically (e.g., via an ”EEG trait” ), but rather generalization is relying on context-
dependence with a real-life situation. This suggests a more active role for the participant in 
transferring self-regulatory strategies in order to induce an “EEG state”, learned during 
neurofeedback, in another context. Recently, the field of neurofeedback research has opened up to 
incorporating immersive 3D virtual-reality (VR) technology and its potential to make learning more 
easily transferrable to a situation similar to the one depicted in the virtual environment (Allanson and 
Mariani,p.1, 1999; Cavazza et al., 2014a,p.1-7, 2014b,p.1; Elgendi et al., 2011,p.1; Hinterberger, 
2011,p.1). Similar to exposure therapy, these approaches could change the underlying physiology in 
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context-specific instances that are characterised by mental disorder (Cavazza et al., 2014b,p.1-6; 
McNally, 2007,p.5). As an example, Gruzelier et al., (2010) randomized actors to an experimental 
group presented with an immersive VR environment mimicking a theatre auditorium combined with 
neurofeedback or to a conventional neurofeedback group (Gruzelier et al., 2010,p.1-5). In a 
subsequent acting performance, participants in the immersive VR group reported consistently higher 
scores on the flow state scale and were rated higher by blinded expert raters compared to the 
traditional neurofeedback group. This line of evidence dovetails with the “skill-acquistion-model” as 
it points to the context-dependence during the acquisition of the self-regulatory skill of neurofeedback 
for the ability to transfer it to a new situation. 
In summery the “skill-acquisition-model” points to change per se and acquisition of the skill in 
response to change as the driving causal model of the effect of neurofeedback. The model underlines 
the necessity of incorporating and understanding cognitive-behavioural factors in line with a 
biopsychosocial conceptualization of mental disorders and treatment. It further predicts 
neurofeedback to be enhanced by explicit strategies and stresses the acquisition of self-regulation of 
brain activity to be context-specific in order to generalize to real-life instances. 
3.3.4 Evaluating the models 
The “conditioning-and-repair” model and the “skill-acquisition” model were presented with the intent 
to contrast two differing approaches to conceptualize neurofeedback (Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.4). 
Their assumptions and narrative for an explanation of the rationale and outcome of neurofeedback is 
also reminiscent of the biomedical and biopsychosocial models from which they descend (Engel, 
1977,p.1-7; Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.2-4; Simonsen and Mohl, 2010,p.36-45). It is intrinsic to this 
discussion that the adequacies and the explanatory power of these models allow inferences regarding 
mind-brain causal relationships, in particular regarding the possible etiology and the underlying 
reason of a particular mental disorder.  In short, the two models assume different causal explanations 
how neurofeedback alters the mind-brain relationship, where the “conditioning-and-repair-model” 
sees specific neuronal deficits as the focal point of neurofeedback, the “skill-acquisition-model” 
predicts that it is the change per se that makes neurofeedback therapeutically effective. The question 
is whether: 1) neurofeedback tailored to a specific neuronal deficit corresponding to a mental disorder 
can repair the disorder through implicit automatic means as predicted by the conditioning-and-repair 
model. As contrasted with 2) neuroflexiblity above anything is related to mental disorder and 
neurofeedback provides the control to effortlessly acquire the skill to self-regulate in comparable 
instances. In facilitating an understanding of how hypotheses are generated within neurofeedback 
research and the predictions heralded by “conditioning-and-repair” and “skill-acquisition” models, 
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the following section provides a presentation of an on-going project on the electrophysiological 
profiles of language learning with the intent to provide neurofeedback in a follow-up study. 
 
3.3 Specific Hypothesis: Enhancement of foreign language learning ability 
3.3.1 Theoretical Background  
As was shown in the systematic review, a large avenue of research within neurofeedback focuses on 
its potential for ADHD and cognitive enhancement. On the basis of this, one could argue that such 
treatment options for these mental disorders could be valuable for learning disorders (Cantor and 
Evans, 2013,p.2). Converging evidence shows that neurofeedback is beneficial in case of disorders 
such as ADHD, dyslexia and reading disability (Breteler et al., 2010,p.1; Monastra et al., 2005,p.1; 
Nazari and Mosanezhad, 2012,p.1). There is evidence that suggests that neurofeedback can improve 
cognitive performance, mood and have other salutogenic effects in healthy individuals (J. Gruzelier, 
2014a,p.1-14, 2014b,p.1, 2014c,p.1, 2014d,p.1-3). Furthermore, research indicates that 
neurofeedback may be able to enhance general mental functions such as working memory and 
attention (Egner and Gruzelier, 2001,p.1-3; Vernon et al., 2003,p.1-9). No research to date however 
has examined whether neurofeedback can enhance foreign language learning abilities (Kratschmer et 
al., 2012,p.1).  
3.3.2 Paradigm  
To provide the necessary justification to administer neurofeedback training for the enhancement of 
language learning, the present author sought to, in collaboration with co-authors, empirically 
investigate the EEG correlates of language learning efficiency (Kratschmer, Leminen, Kvamme and 
Shtyrov, in prep.). In particular, we wanted to investigate whether learners who are efficient in 
acquiring foreign vocabulary (fast learners) versus those that are less efficient (slow learners) show 
different neural activity during basic phonological processing. Prior behavioral experiments have 
found large variability of Danish individuals in  memorizing vocabulary of a foreign language such 
as Italian (Kratschmer et al., 2006,p.1-16). Furthermore, Danish listeners have noteworthy difficulties 
discriminating between syllables containing an palatalized lateral consonant which is part of the 
Italian, but not of the Danish sound system ( gli,/ʎi/) and syllables containing laterals presents on both 
sounds systems  (li,/li/; ibid.). From a series of six hard-to-distinguish Italian phoneme contrasts not 
present in their native language, Danish listeners achieved at or near ceiling effect discrimination of 
all contrasts except for /li/ - /ʎi/ (ibid.).   
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To investigate upon the neural correlates of this discriminatory ability, the mismatch negative (MMN) 
paradigm was utilized. The basic methodology is a measurement of electrophysiological event-related 
potential (ERP) responses, that are time-locked to the specific event of frequent or infrequent (i.e., a 
“deviant”) acoustic stimuli (Pulvermüller and Shtyrov, 2006,p.1-19). The MMN paradigm is able to 
reflect language processing taking place irrespective of attention and thus represents automatic 
phonological processes, in this case for discriminating the syllables /ʎi/) and /li/. Participants who are 
unable to discriminate a stimulus will often show a minimal MMN electrophysiological response 
whereas participants who learn to discriminate the critical sound, have their MMN reliably increased 
(ibid.). The electrophysiological MMN response is often found to be the strongest in the left 
perisylvian neuronal assemblies linking together perceptual information stored in the superior-
temporal cortex and articulatory action-related information in the inferior frontal cortex (Pulvermüller 
and Shtyrov, 2006,p.7-19; Pulvermüller, 2001,p.1-6). Thus, we hypothesized a differentiation in 
neural phonological processing in the left-hemispheric as compared with right-hemispheric areas in 
learners who were efficient in  an online rapid language learning paradigm versus those that were less 
efficient across the time course of the  paradigm. 
In the initial phase of the paradigm, healthy volunteers (n=24) performed a memorization round where 
a Danish word and an Italian word were paired. Subsequently, participants went through a recognition 
round, where they were presented with a Danish word followed by either an incongruent or congruent 
Italian word, to which participants had to indicate whether the pairing was correct based on the prior 
memorization round. As a third task, the participants were exposed to the Danish words as cues for 
articulating the adequate Italian words into a microphone from memory. These three steps 
(memorization, recognition and production) were repeated three times. Finally, participants were 
exposed to two blocks of the MMN paradigm which was based on the syllables  /ʎi/and /li/.  
3.3.2 Analysis 
Based on the participants’ performance in the third production round (i.e. their percent correct 
active memorization), a median split of the group was performed categorizing efficient (fast) 
learners from less efficient (slow) learners (Figure 6) 
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Figure 6: Individual Subjects Correct Percentage in the Production Round 
The figure shows the individual subjects correct percentage in the final production round.  The red line ( - ) 
represents the median split, that formed the ‘slow’ and ‘fast’ learners group. 
 
The mean amplitude of the channels left frontal (LF) channels (FC1,FC3,F1,F3) and right frontal 
(RF) channels (FC2,FC4,F2,F4) were normalized and subtracted from each other to create a 
lateralization index (LI), where positive values represent asymmetrical left dominance (i.e., LI = (LF 
amplitude – RF amplitude) /  (LF amplitude + RF amplitude)) (Teicher et al., 1997,p.6-8). The 
lateralization index serves the purpose of increasing the signal to noise ratio of the MMN paradigm 
in delineating the amplitude dominance of neural assemblies localized in the left-hemispheric regions 
over the right-hemisphere (Galin and Ellis, 1975,p.1-2; Parker et al., 2005,p.3; Shtyrov et al., 
1999,p.1). We compared the lateralization index in a three-way mixed ANOVA with a between-
subject factor of learning Group (slow, fast) and within-subject factor of Condition  (/ʎi/, /li/) and 
Experience (1th block and 2nd block of MMN). Statistical analyses and plots were performed using R 
version (3.3.0) (R Core Team, 2014) with packages ggplot2 (v1.0.1). 
3.3.3 Results 
Twenty-four individuals (12 = fast, 12 = slow learners) participated in the study, where as expected, 
the condition factor was significant (F(1,22) = 4.7, p = 0.04, 𝜂
2
𝐺
 = 0.044). In the critical evaluation 




 = 0.052).   Subsequent post-hoc ANOVA split by Condition and Exposure revealed in 
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0.095) and in the “End” only exposure level a significant Group × Condition interaction (F(1,22) = 
5.5, p = 0.02, 𝜂
2
𝐺
 = 0.080).  
 
Figure 7: Results from the Mismatch Negativity Paradigm 
Top Pane: shows the scalp recordings of the Group × Condition × Experience factors. µV : microvolt. Bottom Left: 
Shows a plot of the mean lateralization index for the different two groups across time. Bottom Right: shows the two 
sound waves of /li/ and /ʎi/.  
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3.3.4 Main Findings  
In this study, using electroencephalography, we show that degrees of efficiency in foreign vocabulary 
learning correlates with different patterns of neural activity during phonological discriminatory 
processing. We show an interaction effect in the lateralization index for fast and slow learners in 
acquiring across experimental blocks the typical neural signatures associated with discriminatory 
ability. Descriptively, it appears that fast learners initially have no left-hemispheric dominance 
differences between the two syllables, whereas towards the end of the experiment, they do. 
Conversely, slow learners start out with an initial difference, which during the course of the 
experiment is lessened. 
We can assume that during the course of the trials, some sort of automatic learning occurs for both 
groups in distinguishing /ʎi/ and /li/ (Pulvermüller and Shtyrov, 2006,p.1-4). The data at hand 
provides evidence that changes in left-hemispheric dominance between the two sounds occurs to a 
greater extent for faster than slower learners. However, at this point it is unclear why the two groups 
differentiate or even if it plays a role in their language learning ability in general. The present findings 
are preliminary in nature as the EEG analysis is as yet restricted to the MMN part of the experiment 
(Kratschmer, Leminen, Kvamme and Shtyrov in prep.).  Although it is worth noting that the learning 
group status was  based on the performance during the third production phase of the experiment (as 
vocabulary memorization the MMN phase resulted in no overt behavioral indication of language 
learning), yet was shown to correlate with different neurophysiological signatures for sound 
discrimination. 
 
3.3.5 Future Directions for Neurofeedback  
One hypothesis arising from the outcome of the experiment is whether the phonological processes 
serve a causal role in determining the memorization (and maybe also the recognition) of word pairs, 
which we used as a beacon for  the categorization of our participants into fast and slow learners. The 
question is whether the degree of neural differentiation during phonological language processing is 
somehow functionally linked to foreign language learning efficiency. Admittedly, it is a non-trivial 
assumption, that the neural signatures observed here are linked to perceptual discrimination of  
phonemes, and with language learning efficiency in general. A demonstrated association between 
neural activity and cognitive processes cannot rule out that the neural activity is merely 
epiphenomenal to the cognitive function (Keizer et al., 2010,p.1-4). In order to rule this out, one has 
to manipulate the neural activity directly and investigate whether that influences the cognitive 
processes (ibid.). Here, applying the basic computational level model of neurofeedback that is based 
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on an observed association between a physiological and a mental function or dysfunction, an attempt 
to shift the activity would have to be performed in order to test such causal claims. Given that 
neurofeedback has shown efficacy with ADHD, dyslexia and reading disability, one could equally 
argue that neurofeedback might be beneficial for language learning efficiency (Breteler et al., 
2010,p.1; Monastra et al., 2005,p.1; Nazari and Mosanezhad, 2012,p.1). Hence, the argument for 
performing neurofeedback to induce the neural signature characteristic of efficient language learners 
during a language learning task would be twofold: to discover if changes in brain state are truly 
causally related to a change in mental state and to investigate the possibility for providing a novel 
therapeutic option for learning disabilities. 
In terms of evaluating the “conditioning-and-repair” and the “skill-acquisition”  models it is possible 
to derive testable predictions from them in the context of neurofeedback to improve language 
learning, based on the models’ characteristic assumptions regarding the particular mind-brain state 
(Gevensleben et al., 2014,p.8). For a “conditioning-and-repair” model would assume that it is the 
particular neuronal deficit in the ability to learn language, in this case the particular similarity of the 
lateralization index observed by the slow learners towards the end of the MMN experiment that relates 
to phonological processes and thus language learning. There is evidence to suggest, that brain activity 
related to cognitive events or ERPs such as is the case with the current discrimination of phonological 
stimulus are reciprocally influenced by the underlying brain oscillations (Başar et al., 1999,p.1-3). 
Thus ERPs are compound changes in amplitude superimposed on already-present so called event 
related oscillations (EROs) which as mentioned interconnect with all of the brain processes, included 
auditory ones (Başar et al., 2000,p.1-2; Pfurtscheller and Lopes, 1999,p.1-5; Doehnert et al., 2008,p.1-
6; Strehl et al., 2006,p.1). Thus, it remains plausible that through the ability of neurofeedback to 
manipulate brain oscillations, could influence phonological discrimination of phonemes and perhaps, 
by extension, language processing in general (Doehnert et al., 2008,p.1-6; Strehl et al., 2006,p.1).  On 
the other hand, the “skill-acquisition” model, would assume that slow learners had less 
neuroflexiblility in their response to the different conditions of /ʎi/ and  /li/ and that this inflexibility 
is causally related to phonological processing and language learning in general. Here, further 
evaluation of the models could also aim to delineate their claim about the etiology of the mind-brain 
relationship and its relation to the specific mental dysfunction. Evidence validating either model, 
would by extension account for the extent of neurofeedback to investigate mind-brain causal 
relationships.  
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3.3.5 Study proposal for neurofeedback  
An approach would be to apply neurofeedback after the discovery of the impaired learning with the 
therapeutic goal of ameliorating the impaired learning. The follow-up question, would be to 
distinguish the explanatory power of the models by applying neurofeedback in different groups with 
methodological approaches of either model. From an initial pool of volunteers, a pre-test of 
memorization and recognition would categorize participants into ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ learners and the 
subsequent study addresses whether neurofeedback of the ‘slow’ learners ameliorates their language 
learning  performance.  Here, the slow learners would be divided into different experimental groups 
the methodology of which align with the assumptions of the models. 
 
Figure 8: Flowchart depicting the passage of participants through the proposed study 
Repair or skill refers to the methodology of the two models of training of up or down-regulating a particular neural 
measure, whereas conventional or immersive refers to the immersive quality of stimulus presented. 
There are at least two ways of providing evidence for the models, by either testing whether it is change 
towards a specific mind-brain state or change per se that influences performance , or testing the 
different assumptions held by the models regarding transfer. For the first question, a “conditioning-
and-repair model” methodology could be protocol-specific neurofeedback up-regulating of the 
particular EEG-frequency pattern seen by the fast learners, (i.e., heightened amplitude over the left 
frontal areas). This model would predict that the ability to increase amplitude in left frontal areas 
would correlate strongly with improve phonological processing and thus language learning abilities.. 
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This would form the basis of Group A (a group receiving conventional neurofeedback for specific 
neuronal deficit). To validate the “skill-acquisition model” one could apply neurofeedback in the 
opposite direction (i.e., decrease amplitude in left frontal areas) in expectance of a “rebound effect” 
or potentially invert the contingencies midsession (Kluetsch et al., 2014,p.1-11; Siniatchkin et al., 
2000,p.1-9). This would form the basis of Group B, (a group receiving neurofeedback in differencing 
directions throughout the training).  
The second question would aim at the models assumptions regarding transfer, as the “skill-
acquisition model” holds that inducing context specific cues with the training would transfer the 
self-regulatory skill more readily. Here, one option would be to administer neurofeedback in 
conjunction with immersive VR depicting a classroom, thus creating context specific cues, which 
would be associated with the place where a follow-up language learning course would be situated. 
One group, Group C, would receive this immersive VR stimuli, with similar contingencies to brain 











Figure 9. Top Left Pane shows an example of conventional neurofeedback paradigm training, where the colour of 
object contingent on a specific brain measure. Bottom Left Pane shows an example of immersive VR environment 
depicting a class room that is evolving dynamically contingent on the brain measure. Right Colum indicates the Group 
contingencies of Group A through D and their respective contingencies. A green arrow represents upregulation of the 
desired neural measure, whereas red represents downregulation.  
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A represent a hyperpolarized manifestation of methodology of “conditioning-and-repair” model and 
the prediction in terms of this model would be that other groups B through D perform similarly to 
Group A. The “skill-acquisition model” would hold that should other groups should outperform A 
and in particular group D, as it represents the ultimate manifestation of its methodology.   
In this way, it is possible to evaluate whether neurofeedback of the specific brain activity could 
change the phonological processing or even other aspects of language acquisition in subsequent 
memorization and recognition rounds. Furthermore, this approach would be able to address the 
assumptions held by the “conditioning-and-repair” model or the “skill-acquisition” model. In the 
event that the results of the proposed study favor a  “conditioning-and-repair” model a specific mind-
brain relationship has been informed of, one that points to changing the brain state “towards” a 
specific state as leading to a larger degree of efficiency in terms of language learning. In contrast, 
should evidence favour a “skill-acquisition” model, it is rather the “change” in of brain state itself 
that is leads to a change in the language learning efficiency. Here, a particular mind-brain relationship 
is informed of through neurofeedback, one that reflects on the mental capacity to learn a new 
language. Further scientific causal accounts between brain states and that of efficiency of language 
learning would have to coherently trace the observed codetermining relationship between a mind state 
characterized by efficient language learning and brain measures indicated by the outcome of the 
study. Whether or not it is the account is truly “causal” will be discussed more extensively in 
subsequent chapters of the thesis. However, should the results of the proposed study show favors any 
of the two models of neurofeedback’s effects a correspondence between the brain and the mind is 
able to be accounted for.  
One may could draw the analogy that language is similar to a particular radio station, and that 
neurofeedback, by tuning the brain to it pick up on the specific phonotactic rules present in the internal 
structure of a foreign language, will improve the learning of the language in question (Kratschmer et 
al., 2012, 2016, p.1-6). In the event of evidence pointing to the “conditioning-and-repair” one could 
qualify that analogy by stating that it is the specific frequency that more readily leads to the observed 
mental state. In contrast the, should evidence favour the “skill-acquisition” model, the analogy would 
be that of changing the knob (i.e., change itself) on the radio as a larger determinant of a change in 
mental state. 
The author of the thesis admits that currently, it is still speculative whether neurofeedback could 
improve efficiency of language learning, or if the data at hand provide a clear rationale for such future 
studies. However, if it was shown that neurofeedback holds the potential to improve language 
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learning abilities, such a novel treatment option would have immense value, both for future scientific 
inquiry and the therapeutic disciplines.  
In short, this chapter has introduced the methodology of EEG along with the rationale for its use in 
neurofeedback research. In a systematic review of the past 15 years of neurofeedback literature, it 
was seen that neurofeedback is increasingly used for training and treatment of a wide spectrum of 
mental functions and dysfunctions. The question regarding neurofeedback’s efficacy for treatment of 
mental disorders will be addressed in later chapters, which the current chapter leaves unaddressed. 
Lastly, based on an a prior association between a psychological construct and neurophysiological 
measurement a hypothesis for neurofeedback research was generated which holds a potential for 
neurofeedback to informing about mind-brain causal relationships. 
 
4. Real-time Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
 
In facilitating the necessary backdrop for a discussion of neurofeedback causal explanatory potential, 
the following section reviews the basis of real-time functional magnetic resonance imaging (rtfMRI) 
neurofeedback. The review provides the basis of the measurement of fMRI, as well as noteworthy 
features of rtfMRI neurofeedback used in later chapters; (i) changing dependent variables to brain 
measurements, (ii) investigating multiple neural substrates (iii) creation of exogenously controlled 
loop paradigms. 
 
4.1 The Basis of rtfMRI Neurofeedback 
In the early 1990s, it was discovered that one could measure the blood oxygenation level-dependent 
(BOLD) contrast related to neural activity in the brain, which provides the basis of functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Brühl, 2015,p.1-5; Ogawa and Lee, 1990,p.1-2). The BOLD 
signal is present due to the automatic increase in oxygen consumption in brain areas that increase 
activity and due to the differential magnetization of oxygenated compared to deoxygenated blood. 
The signal change is relatively weak, around 0.5-1.5 % compared to baseline and thus, fMRI studies 
utilize repeated stimulation reliable identify signal changes related to experimental stimuli amongst 
unsystematic variations in the signal (e.g. fluctuations not related to the stimuli) (ibid.). Moreover, a 
typical fMRI study will often rely on contrastive analysis, whereby images of this functional brain 
activity would be acquired when a subject performed a “control” condition (such as receiving non-
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painful stimuli) and subtracted with the “active” condition (Amaro and Barker, 2006,p.4). 
Conventionally, this type of analysis would take researchers days to complete (deCharms, 2007,p.2). 
Now, with real-time fMRI (rtfMRI), that process has been reduced to seconds (ibid.). A common 
definition of rtfMRI is thus any process that uses information from a MRI scanner where the analysis 
and display of the fMRI data keep pace with data acquisition (Sulzer et al., 2013,p.2). Therefore, a 
hallmark of rtfMRI is its ability to be used for neurofeedback. 
Compared to EEG, rtfMRI neurofeedback displays several strengths such as a higher spatial 
resolution while being able to cover the whole brain including sub-cortical brain structures. Contrary 
to other intervention techniques such as transcranial magnetic or deep brain stimulation, that apply 
stimulation to the brain, rtfMRI is a non-invasive method for inducing a particular brain activity 
(Pinel, 2011,p.106-250; Sulzer et al., 2013,p.6).  
4.2 Changing the dependent variable 
The usually fMRI experiments study brain activity as the dependent variable (DV) of an independent 
experimental manipulation, while in rtfMRI the brain activity has become the independent (IV). It 
can thus serve as important tool to guide and drive the experiment (ibid.). As a consequence it has 
been argued that rtfMRI neurofeedback has the capacity to go beyond mere correlation and address 
questions of causality between brain and behavior, thus representing a valuable tool for 
neuroscientific inquiry (Sulzer et al., 2013,p.6). Taking one of the iconic rtfMRI studies as an 
example, deCharms et al., (2005) showed that through self-regulation of the BOLD response in the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) participants could reduce their own pain perception. (deCharms et 
al., 2005,p.1-6). It’s important to recognize that neural activity associated with chronic pain is a vast 
matrix of several brainstem, thalamic and cortical networks (Petrovic and Ingvar, 2002,p.1; Peyron 
et al., 2004,p.1, 2000,p.1). However, functional imaging studies seemed to indicate a double 
dissociation, whereby only the location and discrimination of pain was associated with certain 
thalamic, somatosensory and insular regions whereas only the emotional and attentional concomitants 
of pain sensation was associated with increased activity in the ACC. As a consequence, when subjects 
were suggested to perceive the noxious stimuli as unpleasant ACC activity seemed to increase as 
compared with when participants were asked to perceive it as less unpleasant (ibid.). The evidence is 
still only indicative of an association as it is not clear at this point whether the relationship is a causal 
one (deCharms, 2007,p.5; Keizer et al., 2010,p.2; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014,p.3-28). One causal 
hypothesis could be that ACC activity causes the change in perceived pain and another view would 
state that ACC activity is merely a byproduct or “epiphenomena” of the change in pain perception 
(ibid.). 
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With the advent of rtfMRI, deCharms and colleagues (2005) were able to provide self-regulation of 
the ACC region and see its effect on perceived levels of pain (deCharms et al., 2005,p.1-6). Potential 
confounding variables could be reduced by applying a control group, such as either without feedback, 
sham feedback, or feedback yoked from another subject or brain region. The researchers were able to 
feedback the activity of the ACC to patients suffering from chronic pain while they were in the MRI 
scanner, enabling them to self-regulate their brain activation. The result was a reduction in perception 
of pain, while in control groups receiving no feedback, sham feedback or yoked feedback the 
corresponding reduction in pain perception was absent (ibid.). In comparison to the previous where 
unpleasant pain perception was the IV that was manipulated through hypnosis, with an examination 
of its effect on brain activity as the DV, in the case deCharms et al., (2005) the variables have been 
changed, such that brain activity is now the IV and perception the DV (deCharms et al., 2005,p.1-5; 
Peyron et al., 2000,p.1) 
 
The argument that one can infer causality between activity in the ACC and perception of pain will 
discussed  in subsequent chapters. (Table 3) provides a short overview of studies that applied a similar 
region of interest (ROI) approach, which illuminate how a given cognitive function or disorder can 
be regulated through rtfMRI-neurofeedback of an anatomical region. The overview is not 
comprehensive but aims to demonstrate the potential of rtfMRI-neurofeedback for regulation of a 
multitude of motor, sensory and supra-modal functions along with addiction and mental disorders.  
Function / Disorder Study Brain Region ↑/↓ Outcome 
     
Chronic pain (deCharms et al., 
2005) 
Rostral ACC ↑,↓ Patients learned control, associated with 
decreased pain intensity, compared with no, 
yoked and sham NF controls.  
Motor function  
/ Motor imagery 
(Bray et al., 2007) Motor / 
somatosensory 
cortex 
↑  Instrumentally induced control over specific 
regions leading to post-test increases in activity, 
compared to non-rewarded regions.  
Emotional  
linguistic ability 
(Rota et al., 2009) Right Inferior 
Frontal Gyrus 
↑ Improvement in task on emotional prosodic 
intonations but not for syntactic processing.  




↑ Participants who learned to regulate increased 
their perceptual sensitivity on a visual 




(Brühl et al., 2014) Right Amygdala ↓ Down-regulation lead to decreased amygdala 
activity in subsequent viewing  conditions of 
emotionally laden pictures 




(Sitaram et al., 
2014) 
Anterior Insula ↑ Increased functional connectivity in emotional 
network with higher subjective aversive ratings 




(Linden et al., 2012) VLPFC, DLPFC, 
insular cortex 
↑ Successful upregulation of target areas 
implicated in control of emotion. Clinical 
improvement on depression scores. 
Smoking Cessation 
 




Decreased ACC activity lead to decreased cue 





(Scheinost et al., 
2014, 2013) 
OFC and anterior 
PFC 
↑,↓ OFC regulation produced lasting changes in 
connectivity and anxiety. Initial connectivity 
predicted NF success. 
Parkinsons / Motor 
Function 
(Subramanian et al., 
2011) 
SMA ↑ PD patients who received NF showed 
improvement in motor symptoms compared to 
PD matched controls 
Table 3. Overview of real-time functional magnetic resonance imaging studies 
NF ; neurofeedback, ACC; anterior cingulate cortex, SMA; supplementary motor area, PFC; prefrontal cortex,  VLPFC; 
ventrolateral PFC, DLPFC; dorsolateral PFC, mPFC; middle PFC,OFC; orbitofrontal cortex. ↑/↓ direction of regulation. 
Table is adapted from (Brühl, 2015,p.5-6) 
4.3 Investigating Multiple Mental Strategies and Neural Substrates   
A similar strategy that may underline the extent of neurofeedback to investigate causal mind-brain 
relationships is provided by Hanlon (2013) and Li (2013) and colleagues, who tested whether 
neurofeedback could reduce cigarette craving tendencies in nicotine-dependent cigarette smokers 
(Hanlon et al., 2013,p.1-3; Li et al., 2013,p.1-9). The authors instructed participants to manipulate 
their craving for cigarettes using two different mental strategies. In a “reduce craving” approach, 
participants were instructed to “reduce craving”, while they were “feed” back ACC activity 
corresponding to a thermometer display that they were told to decrease. In another “increase 
resistance” approach, participants were instructed to increase resistance while were provided 
neurofeedback based on their middle prefrontal cortex (mPFC) activity that they were told to increase. 
The results indicate that the mental strategy of “reducing craving” combined with ACC 
neurofeedback was successful in reducing cue craving to smoking pictures, whereas “increasing 
resistance” and mPFC activity was not. Although there may be a multitude of different explanations 
why the combination of one mental strategy and ROI failed, the study is the one of the first of its kind 
to hint at a new possible avenue for testing different mental strategies and their neuroanatomical 
correlates (ibid.). Here, rtfMRI provides the means to test whether different mental strategies 
(corresponding to the mental state of the participant) holds more prominence in inducing change in 
the brain activity. 
The goal is not just see one’s brain in real time or to see if a particular mental strategy can induce a 
particular brain activity pattern but to develop self-regulatory control over brain activity 
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corresponding with enhanced in control over the related cognitive processes (deCharms, 2007).  
Furthermore, different neural substrates such as the ACC or mPFC proposed to be involved in that 
particular mental function could be ROI targets of the rtfMRI technique, allowing for testing of 
whether the change in activation in that substrate is significantly more advantageous than another. 
4.4 Exogenously controlled closed loop paradigm 
The most common form of rtfMRI neurofeedback is endogenous, in which subjects are fed back their 
self-regulatory efforts via their BOLD response in a continuous loop, similar to the first illustration 
shown in section 1.1: thesis objective (Sulzer et al., 2013,p.6). This is known as an endogenously 
controlled loop since each successive signal change is fed back immediately to the participant and 
made available for themselves to control. In contrast, in exogenous neurofeedback, the feedback 
signal is not presented to the subject, but rather it is used to trigger an external event or stimuli. 
Consequently, the key difference between endogenous and exogenous neurofeedback is that in the 
former the participant is aware and can thus control the feedback signal.  
In the first of two experiments by Hinds et al., (2013), the authors show that higher baseline brain 
activity in  a region involved in planning of motor actions called the supplementary motor area (SMA) 
and lower activity in regions implicated in “lapses in attention” and “mind-wandering” called the 
default-mode network (DMN) was predictive of reduced reaction time latencies in a vigilance task 
(Hinds et al., 2013,p.1-9; Mason et al., 2007,p.1-2). In other words, just prior to having to react 
quickly to an event, the specific constellation of activity brain in regions implicated in planning of 
motor actions and mind-wandering can inform of how quickly one reacts. The authors then used 
rtfMRI to measure in real time the ratio of SMA to DMN activity, and used this ratio to trigger the 
event of having to react quickly. The authors found that the by “waiting” for a particular SMA/DMN 
ratio they could control the behavioural measurement of reaction time (ibid.). This approach to rtfMRI 
allows for stimulus presentation to be dynamically dependent on the level of brain activation within 
a given ROI. It is thus an exogenously triggered stimulus presentation, because it is the experimenter 
that uses a computer algorithm to “waits” for certain brain activations to occur and uses that to trigger 
an event. The experimental paradigm takes on an evolving nature where the stimulus presentation is 
entrained to the brain activity of the individual, serving as a novel approach to investigate neuronal 
dynamics (Sulzer et al., 2013,p.6f). 
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5. Neurofeedback for Causal Inference in Neuroscience 
The present chapter will wind up the prior mentioned chapters into a discussion of whether 
neurofeedback has a potential to inform about mind-brain causal relationships. In order to provide an 
instructive discussion the chapter will first outline how science in general, accounts for causality in 
empirical relationships. Furthermore, the chapter will examine Hill’s (1965) criteria of causation, in 
addition to pointers on the perspectives of causal inference, such as directionality, necessity and 
sufficiency. In facing up to question of the potential of neurofeedback for informing about mind-brain 
causal relationships a discussion of the strengths and limitations in inferring causality through 
neurofeedback research. The author proposes that there exists several key promising as well as 
problematic aspects of using neurofeedback for causal inference of mind-brain relationships. 
 
5.1 Causal Inference in Neuroscience 
5.1.1 Rank of Scientific Accounts 
The process of science seeks to unravel the phenomena of the natural world by discovering and 
characterising relationships to greater and greater degree of detail. (Machamer et al., 2000,p.1-24). 
Fundamentally, this is done through asking and answering questions at an ever increasing level of 
sophistication and difficulty (Leek, 2015,p.1-12). In terms of data analysis, if one were to rank the 
types of scientific questions by difficulty, one way to do so would be the following way; Exploratory, 
Inferential, Predictive, Causal, Mechanistic. The exploratory or descriptive accounts are prima facie 
of a given phenomenon and comes with little or no interpretation of the phenomena and there is no 
quantification of whether the discovered relationship would hold in the population at large. The 
exploratory rank is often the first avenue of scientific exploration. An example could be Percival 
Pott’s observation of a heightened degree of cancer in chimney sweepers in the 18th hundred. At the 
time no biological understanding of the phenomena existed and thus no interpretation towards and 
underlying cause was made. 
 
The second inferential rank of accounts is the most common in formal scientific literature and 
attempts to quantify whether the observed association is robust enough to be present beyond the 
sample at hand.  As an example the present author used Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) to 
compare structural brain volume between genders in healthy volunteers (HV) and binge drinkers 
(BD), characterised by excessive intake of alcohol (Kvamme et al., 2016,p.1-7). Resulting MRI 
analysis showed several wide-spread brain clusters qualified by group-by-gender interaction, 
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whereby BD females had increased volume and BD males had decreased volume compared with their 
HV counterparts. The account is inferential since the association was systematic to such a degree that 
the opposite (i.e., that the association was not present) is deemed unlikely given the traditional set 
alpha level of 0.05 (Leek, 2015,p.5f;  Nickerson, 2000,p.7). The inferential account can only observe 
that a particular relationship or association between two measurements can be inferred to exist in the 
population at large and cannot make causal statements about why it exists (ibid.). Consequently the 
brain volumetric group-by-gender interaction could be interpreted as either caused by different 
neurotoxic sensitivities between genders to alcohol or the brain volume differences could be an 
endophenotypic risk factor for the binge drinking behaviour for either gender (Kvamme et al., 
2016,p.1-7). In the first scenario, the intake of alcohol is what causes the brain changes and in the 
later scenario it is the brain changes that cause the intake of alcohol (ibid.). While the inferential 
account gives a snap-shot of the association between factors at one specific point in time – that is, it 
is cross-sectional, the predictive account often attempts to use available measures to predict future 
measurements (Leek, 2015,p.3-6). As an example, Whelan and colleagues measured several psycho-
social and biological variables in 14-year old adolescents and applied machine learning techniques to 
identify predictors of future binge drinkers (Whelan et al., 2014,p.1-17). The authors found that 
epidemiological, biological and psychosocial variables such as smoking status, genetics, brain 
measures personality factors and history of prior romantic relationships were able to predict whether 
adolescents became binge drinkers by age 16. Interestingly the authors show that the accuracy of the 
statistical model in predicting future binge drinking status was not due any measure in isolation and 
that bio- and psycho-social factors were equally strong classifiers (ibid.). The predictive account 
shows that a current measure predicts and predates a subsequent measure without explain why (i.e., 
it remains unknown if the former is cause of later) (Leek, 2015,p.3-6). In other words, the initiation 
of binge drinking seen by the 16-year olds in Whelan et al., study (2014) is not necessarily caused by 
the specific bio-psycho-social pattern observed 2 years prior, and could potentially have occurred 
regardless (Whelan et al., 2014,p.1-17). 
The causal rank of scientific accounts requires that one isolated independent variable (IV) is 
manipulated whilst holding other confounding variables equal with subsequent measurement on a 
dependent variable (DV) (Coolican, 2014,p.56-65; Leek, 2015,p.3-6; Deacon, 2013,p.8f). This 
rational underlies the paradigm of the randomized control trials (RTC). In RTCs the participants are 
randomly assigned to an experimental and control group, that identical to the experimental group in 
every aspect except for the manipulation in the IV. The RTC paradigm increases the confidence that 
observed differences in DV is not confounded by placebo, passage of time or Hawthorne effects 
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(ibid.). In contrast with the inferential and predictive ranks the causal rank of scientific explanations 
accounts for both the IV average effect on the DV as well as establishes confidence that the direction 
of the causal relationship goes from the IV to the DV. The leap from a causal to a mechanistic 
explanation of a phenomena is not minor, as in a mechanistic explanation must show that the IV 
always and exclusively determines the DV. As an example, decades of research have shown a clear 
causal relationship between smoking and cancer, however it is not a 1:1 relationship as other causes 
may increase or decrease the risk of cancer. A mechanistic account must show that no other IV(s) 
need to be accounted for and the change in DV is always and exclusively determined stringently down 
to mathematical precision by the IV (Leek, 2015,p.3-6; Machamer et al., 2000,p.1-24). If a 
mechanistic account is represented schematically by A  B  C then it would require an account for 
all of the causal influences determining C as sine qua non, with reference to the mechanistic nature 
of the account. Such accounts happens rarely if ever, outside the realm of math and engineering, 
however one may argue that the scientific accounts of phenomena such as neurotransmission and 
DNA base sequences are mechanisms that science is close to give a mechanistic account of (ibid.).   
Having thoroughly shown the almost unreachable level or detail required for mechanistic accounts, 
causal accounts, can be seen as the penultimum of scientific accounts and presents themselves with 
comparable stringent conditions before they are truly satisfactory. One can argue that within the 
neuroscientific field, researchers are at a turning point where methods for establishing causal accounts 
are proliferating in concurrence with increased scientific and technological advancements. Within 
neuroimaging, causal inference is a central goal and in recent years several technically methods such 
as granger causality and dynamic causal modelling have been advanced, that focus specifically on 
inferring causal relationships (Grosse-Wentrup et al., 2016,p.1). Similarly, neurostimulation 
techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) are also methods that allows for establishing a causal link between brain activity 
and behaviour (Clarke et al., 2014,p.1; Sliwinska et al., 2014,p.1; Sulzer et al., 2013,p.6). Similar to 
neurofeedback, TMS can manipulate and investigate brain activity by either temporally suppressing 
local neural activity or by temporally activating (Pascual-Leone et al., 1998,p.1) As will be discussed 
further in subsequent chapters, EEG and rtfMRI neurofeedback might also hold a potential to address 
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5.1.2 Hill’s Criteria of Causation 
One of the more influential set of criteria for causal inference has been formulated by Sir Austen 
Bradford Hill (Hill, 1965,p.1-6; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014,p.1-10). He proposed that the confidence 
in interpreting that one variable causes another can be evaluated on the basis of nine criteria. These 
are; the strength of the relation. It is clear that for A to cause B there should be a relationship between 
them such the probability of the presence or different levels of B corresponds with the presence or 
the different levels of A to a degree that is measureable. Consistency refers to the generalizability and 
replicability of findings, i.e., that the association is present in different settings using different 
methodologies and so on. Specificity references to the presence of a 1:1 relationship such that A 
always an exclusively cause B, which similarly was required in order to satisfy a mechanistic account 
(Hill, 1965,p.1-6; Leek, 2015,p.3-6; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014,p.1-10). As noted by Hill (1965), 
many effects have multiple causes, so although specificity indicates causality, the absence of 
specificity does not negate the possibility of a causal account yet it negates a mechanistic account 
(ibid.). The criterion of a biological gradient, is similar to a dose-response curve meaning that there 
exists a continuous relationship between every level of A that corresponds to every level of B. For 
instance knowing that death rate from cancer correlates positively with smoked cigarettes adds more 
confidence in a causal account compared with knowing only that smokers have a higher death rate 
than non-smokers. The plausibility criterion means that scientific knowledge can give a theoretical 
explanation as to why it is that it is A that causes B. This comes with an obvious caveat, as mentioned 
earlier, Pott’s observation of a heightened degree of cancer in chimney sweepers was not backed by 
any plausible explanation, as at the time, the discovered relationship was only exploratory. Coherence 
implies that the suggested causal relation between A and B doesn’t’ interferer with any knowledge 
about A, B or another established causal account explaining A and B’s co-occurrence. The most 
crucial criteria for inferring causality according to Hill (1965), are those of temporality and 
experimental evidence. The temporality criteria means that the likelihood that A causes B increases 
if A precedes B and not the other way around. This parallels the logic that follows from prospective 
studies that attempt to provide a predictive account. Experimental studies showing that manipulating 
the variable A leads to changes in B is one of the strongest demonstration of causality. One must 
however precede with caution when drawing the casual conclusion that A  B as it may be the case 
that A could have led to changes in an unidentified process C which resulted in changes in B. This 
would mean that the causal chain of effect between A and B is indirect (i.e., A  C  B) whereby 
manipulating C would hold more of a strength in manipulation B as compared with A. This case, is 
still indicative of a causal relationship between A and B, A is however not causally primary to B, 
where C is. The last criterion is that of analogies meaning if scientific knowledge indicates a causal 
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relationship between the constructs A´ and B´ it makes the causal relationship between A and B more 
likely. 
5.1.3 Inference is not observation 
When dealing with the thorny question of causality, there arises the fundamental problem of causal 
inference which refers to the impossibility of ever observing causality (Holland, 1986,p.1-21). Here, 
the operative word is observe since causal relationships cannot be known through observation but 
only through inference, meaning deriving logical conclusions from factual evidence (ibid.). In 
inferring causality, it is often the case that any of Hill’s criteria may be necessary yet not sufficient to 
provide a convincing causal account. Here, choosing an example regarding a question of causality 
that most feel they intuitively know the answer to; does smoking cause cancer? The tobacco industry 
claimed that the observed correlation between lung cancer and smoking is due to lung cancer causing 
individuals to start smoking (White, 1990,p.1-10; Novella, 2015,p.159ff). What is the evidence for 
opposite claim; that smoking causes lung cancer ? The consistency or the strength of the association 
could be counter-argued by “correlation does not imply causation”, and one could even entertain the 
plausibility criteria that lung cancer victims often feel stressed and since stress may lead to smoking 
that is the reason for the observed association (Andersen et al., 1994,p.1; Holland, 1986,p.1-21; 
Novella, 2015,p.159ff; Pomerleau and Pomerleau, 1991,p.1). In other words the strength of the 
association, consistency and plausibility alone does not provide enough evidence to discern which 
causal hypothesis is more likely. The reason that it is more likely that smoking causes lung cancer 
compared with the reverse is because of the temporally criteria. Here, research shows that non-
smokers will initiate smoking before the onset of lung cancer and that cancer victims who quit 
smoking will reduce their risk of dying from cancer compared with those who continue smoking 
(White, 1990,p.1-10; Novella, 2015,p.159ff). In other words, questions addressed through multiple 
causal criteria can be used to inferentially triangulate the most likely causal hypotheses given the 
evidence (ibid.).  
5.1.4 Directionality, Necessity and Sufficiency.   
In explaining causal relationships there exists different perspectives on what qualifies as causality, 
such as a narrow view of causality which require a unidirectional cause and effect (Lilienfeld, 
2007,p.6-7; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014,p.1-9). This view of causality is not dissimilar to the 
requirements of a mechanistic account. Alternatively, a bi-directional relationship view of causality 
acknowledges that the relationship between A and B may arise mutually. An even less stringent view 
of causality is a multi-directional perspective that acknowledges that effects may have multiple causes 
thus rendering the specificity criterion less relevant. As an example, there is a general consensus for 
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psychologists nowadays that the causal links to disorders such as anxiety and depression consists of 
a complex interplay between genes and environment. A useful heuristic that clarifies this multi-
directional view of causality, is that of a man falling to the ground resulting in his fatality. If no other 
factors intervened a unidirectional cause-effect relationship view of causality would point to being 
pushed out of a plane as the main factor in the etiology of falling to one’s death. However, being on 
the plane in the first place constitutes a vulnerability factor, for a falling death. Such a vulnerability 
is not necessary since the man could have fallen from a tall building nor sufficient since being on a 
plane doesn’t deterministically result in being pushed out of it. Next, consider the case that falling 
may not always result in fatality, for instance wearing a parachute counts as an attenuating factor for 
falling to one’s death. Thus, in discussing causal factors, the directionality of A and B is an important 
consideration. Furthermore, causal relationships may serve as neither necessary nor sufficient for an 
effect, but rather as attenuating or exacerbating factors that nevertheless cause the effect to be less or 
more likely (ibid.).  
 
5.2  The Causal Explanatory Potential of Neurofeedback 
In the following section, a framework for discussing key aspects of how neurofeedback potential and 
limitations in informing about mind-brain causal relationships is provided. The present author, 
proposes that there exists cautions and bold claims regarding neurofeedback’s mind-brain causal 
explanatory potential. An example of a cautions claim could be that “neurofeedback enables 
researchers to go beyond mere inferential scientific accounts” (Sulzer et al., 2013,p.7). As a contrast 
a bold claim would that “neurofeedback informs of unidirectional causal relationship from brain to 
mind” (Crick, 1995,p.3; Franks, 2013,p.107-112). Both claims are proposed for illustrative purposes 
and represent extreme poles of mind-brain causal inference. As will be discussed below, there exists 
several key potential advantages and several key limitations in substantiating the cautious and bold 
claims for inferring causality. The remainder of the chapter will deal with these key potentials and 
limitations initially and discuss how they reflect on the problem statement of the thesis. Concluding 
the thesis, the present author based on a synthesis of the discussed material argue that the advantages 
and disadvantages can be amplified and attenuated respectively when neurofeedback is coupled with 
other methodological approaches.  
In order to approach the question of whether neurofeedback can inform about causal relationships it 
is useful to distinguish between the easier and harder sub-questions. An example of an easy question 
would be whether neurofeedback can inform about brain-to-brain causal relation. Here, several 
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authors advocate for the ability of both EEG and rtfMRI neurofeedback as being able to improve the 
neuroscientific understanding of causality of brain function (Caria et al., 2007,p.1; Keizer et al., 
2010,p.1-8; Lee et al., 2012,p.1-2; Ros et al., 2013,p.5). These questions ask whether neurofeedback 
(N) that changes one physical brain measure (P1) causally changes a subsequent physical brain 
measure (P2 ) represented schematically as (N  P1  P2). To name a few; such questions have led 
to causal accounts of rtfMRI neurofeedback ability to causally increase connectivity between brain 
networks and EEG neurofeedback ability to causally change subsequent resting EEG activity (ibid.).  
The harder question that this chapter aims to tackle regards whether (i); given that neurofeedback 
changes a physical measure (P) corresponding with a change in the individuals self-reported mental 
state (M), is it reasonable to conclude (ii) that; we have been informed about a causal relationship 
between M  and P ? The question considers both instances where change (Δ) in physical brain measure 
is corresponding () with change in mental state (Δ-P  Δ-M) and where particular brain states 
(P1 and P2) correspond with mental states (M1 and M2) represented thusly (P1  M1 & P2  M2). 
To reiterate the main metatheoretical question of the thesis; have we through evidence provided by 
neurofeedback research been informed of a correspondence between mind and brain so as to satisfy 
a causal codetermining law between M and P (James, 1890,p.1-10).  
Moving forward this section will apply Hill’s (1965) causal criteria on the evidence within 
neurofeedback research (Hill, 1965,p.1-6). In addition, it will be discussed whether neurofeedback 
research informs of any causal directionality of mind-brain relationship as well as their necessity and 
sufficiency. The overall goal is to determine, in light of the discussion on causal inference using 
neurofeedback, whether we now have confidence in transcending our rank of scientific account of 
that mind-brain relationship from an inferential to a causal one.   
In discussing causal inference in neurofeedback research the discussion will assume that Hill’s criteria 
of strength relation and consistency applies to the premise, (i) neurofeedback change of a physical 
measure (P) resulting in change in the individuals self-reported mental state (M). Such assumptions 
may in the future be violated should there amount evidence that the relationship repeatedly fails to be 
replicated. The examples of neurofeedback research are thus not of primary concern to the matter at 
hand, they are only meaningful, insofar as they inform the discussion regarding the potential of 
neurofeedback to make causal mind-brain claims. As such the analysis on their causal explanatory 
potential should function as a template that can be applied to other neurofeedback studies. Another 
core assumption is that the measures derived from subjective introspection has construct validly in 
terms of the mental state of the individual, even if such an assumption may be debatable (Nisbett and 
Wilson, 1977,p.1-27; Overgaard et al., 2010,p.1; Petitmengin and Bitbol, 2009,p.1-11). 
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5.2.1 Application of Hills criteria to neurofeedback 
The criterion of plausibility, requires that there are scientific explanatory links between 
neurofeedback and induction of a particular brain state in addition to a link between a physical brain 
measure and an associated mental state. The first link is self-evident in the ability of the method 
neurofeedback to change a particular brain measure (Cox et al., 1995,p.1-6) Taking deCharms et al., 
(2005) example of changing ACC activity to change pain perception, the later link is provided by 
prior neuroimaging studies having generally supported that ACC activity correlate positively with 
unpleasantness of pain sensations. (Petrovic and Ingvar, 2002,p.1; Peyron et al., 2004,p.1, 2000,p.1; 
deCharms et al.,2005,p.1-6). On the basis of this, one can conclude it plausible that neurofeedback 
can causally induce a brain state resulting in a particular mental state. 
Following Hill (1965), causal relationship are often characterized by a biological gradient or does-
response curve. Such accounts are subject-specific to the mind-brain relationship investigated through 
neurofeedback. The appearance of a biological gradient for example, with pain perception and ACC 
activity as investigated by deCharms et al., (2005) would not serve as evidence for a biological 
gradient for other neurofeedback studies, yet it would serve as a causal criteria of analogy. It can be 
argued that the most convincing form of biological gradients are those that both take the form of 
within and between subject measures. As an example it is shown that between individual the higher 
the cerebral blood flow in the ACC the larger the rating of unpleasantness of pain (Rainville et al., 
1997,p.3). Moreover, deCharms et al. (2005) also show that within each individual the more effective 
neurofeedback decreases ACC activity, the more a decrease in measures of pain perception 
(deCharms et al., 2005,p.1-6).   
As mentioned, one of the stronger types of criteria of causality is that of experiment, that permit the 
IV claimed as cause to be manipulated differentially in a minimum of two groups and measurement 
of the effect on the DV that is hypothesized to be an antecedent from the cause. In the case of 
deCharms et al., (2005) a reduction in perception of pain followed only in the experimental group 
receiving neurofeedback of the ACC while in placebo groups receiving no feedback, sham feedback 
or yoked feedback change in pain perception was absent (ibid.). This counts as strong evidence that 
neurofeedback meditated regulation of ACC activity is causally related to change in pain perception. 
Since placebo groups received identical instruction and attempted cognitive control over their pain 
similar to the test group yet with absence of valid ACC rtfMRI information (ibid.). For the experiment 
not to show a causal link between neurofeedback of ACC and pain perception would require that the 
neurofeedback process in the test and control groups to somehow determined the random assignment 
to each group, which obviously isn’t the case (deCharms et al., 2005,p.1-6; Grosse-Wentrup et al., 
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2016,p.1). The causal relationship can be stated as follows; that neurofeedback of the specific physical 
brain measure (NP1), in this case the ACC, causally impacted the physical brain measure (P1) by 
decreasing activity with a link between this and the mental state (M1) in this case less unpleasant pain 
perception. Represented schematically (NP1  P1 & M1 ) where the arrow represents a causal 
relationship.  
 
5.2.2 Tertium Quid 
From this study involving how ACC modulates pain perception a further strong case can be made 
about the causal role of ACC modulation and pain perception, taking the form of (P1   M1). Here, 
the authors find it conceivable that ACC activity changes may be driven by top–down connections 
from a higher order region that causally affects both ACC activity and pain perception as independent 
quantities (deCharms et al., 2005,p.1-6; Sulzer et al., 2013,p.6). Thus, the appearance of a relationship 
between P1 and M1 may arise due to a tertium quid or (“a third thing of indeterminate character”) 
(Field et al., 2012,p.49). In this view, the causal relationship contains an unidentified tertium quid in 
this case a physical brain region (P?) that intersects the causal relationship such that (NP1  P?  P1 
 M1 ). This is referred to as the principle of completeness, that any physical brain state will cause 
other physical brain state (Kurthen, 2010,p.5).  
This does not negate the prior mentioned causal relationship that neurofeedback has induced change 
in P1 and that there is a corresponding change in M1 , it is just unclear how it has done so. It is still 
reasonable to assume that there could be a causal link between change (Δ) in the physical brain 
measure (P) and mental state (M) represented as so; (Δ-P  Δ-M). Stated another way, there isn’t 
any evidence against this causal hypothesis, however there are no data that favour it when compared 
with causal hypothesis involving a tertium quid. In this case, the argument pointing to a tertium quid 
is an argument that the ACC region may not have causal primacy with respect to the effect on the 
mental state of unpleasant pain sensation (Desmond, 2004,p.1; Lilienfeld, 2007,p.7). The argument 
posits that the unidentified brain region is a stronger and more important causal factor of the mental 
state. Thus far, what has been established is that neurofeedback in isolation cannot truly address 
whether the particular physical brain measure holds a causal primacy role in determining a given 
mental state (P1   M1). It can however address that some causal relationship exists, if not directly 
between P1 and M1, then rather as a tertium quid causally related to them both. It is important to 
realize, that the argument from tertium quid is actually an empirical objection, that creates new causal 
hypotheses that can be addressed through research.  
56 | P a g e  
 
The first way of addressing such a causal hypothesis is due to the advent of technically methods in 
neuroimaging such as granger causality and dynamic causal modelling, as they have as their prime 
focus the inference of causal primacy (Hamilton et al., 2011,p.1; Palaniyappan et al., 2013,p.1; 
Roebroeck et al., 2005,p.1). Specifically, they make use of the temporality criteria in addressing 
causality by looking at whether neuronal activation in another region came prior to activation in the 
one in question (ibid.). Through such an investigation it may be shown that one brain region 
connecting with the ACC in a top-down fashion modulate ACC and that this is what holds causal 
primacy in changing the mental state. A testable prediction that follows from this hypothesis is that 
increasing the connectivity between this to-be-identified region and ACC through neurofeedback 
should outperform the traditional modulation of ACC in isolation regarding the one induced in the 
mental state. Here, through metatheoretical reflection on the neuroscientific arsenal of investigative 
techniques one can argue  that neurofeedback in isolation may not hold a primary role in establishing 
a causal account (Sonne-Ragans, 2012,p.25-32). However, by applying techniques such as granger 
causality in unison, they complement each other in order to address the mind-brain relationship in 
question (ibid.). 
Alternatively, one could attempt to provide evidence against the causal hypotheses pointing to a 
tertium quid by testing whether neurofeedback regulation of other regions results in change in the 
mental state. Such a strategy is actually already inherent in the use of yoked neurofeedback placebo 
group, which in case of deCharms et al., (2005) was the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) a region in 
relatively close proximity to the ACC but without any plausible relevance to pain perception. What 
the use of such a placebo group provides evidence for is that the PCC is not the tertium quid in 
question. Thus, the strategy of testing whether neurofeedback modulation of multiple neural 
substrates in addition the one in question are causally involved in a given mental state also holds a 
potential to discover causal mind-brain relationships.  
 
5.2.3 Testing multiple mental strategies and neural substrates  
The strategy of testing multiple neural substrates for discovering causal mind-brain relationships is 
exemplified through through Hanlon (2013) and Li (2013) and colleagues, showing that 
neurofeedback of specific regions combined with specific mental strategies can reduce cigarette 
craving (Hanlon et al., 2013,p.1-3; Li et al., 2013,p.1-9). Here, the authors show that the 
neurofeedback modulation of the ACC region was effective in reducing craving whereas the middle 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) did not result in change in subjective craving scores. In other words, 
neurofeedback of the ACC region (NP1 ) was effective in changing physical brain activity of the ACC 
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and also concurrently (&) the mental state of craving, (NP1  P1 & M1), whereas neurofeedback of 
mPFC (NP2) changed only the activity in the NP2 without resulting in change in M1  (NP2  P2 ≠  
M1). Such later evidence showing a non-relationship is not useless, as it is rather informative that 
regulation of one physical brain measure is unsuccessful. Arguably such null-results are important to 
publish within the neurofeedback literature, so as avoid further attempts to induce change in the 
mental state through the unsuccessful brain measure (Rosenthal, 1979,p.1-2). This kind of 
information is valuable as showing that one brain region is unlikely to have causal impact on a mental 
state is a way of gathering evidence for a criteria of specificity for another mind-brain causal 
relationship. On the other hand it entirely plausible that the mental function could be realized by other 
neural substrates that the one that is measured, akin to the function of “seeing” mediated by Bach-y-
Rita’s tactile vision devise (Bach-Y-Rita et al., 1969,p.1f; Overgaard and Mogensen, 2011,p.1-4).  
Another problematic aspect of this type of strategy is that it is conceivable that neurofeedback of a 
given region (say NP3) does not lead to a change in the physical brain measure (P3) and does not 
influence the measured mental state (M3). This can be represented like this; (NP3 ≠  P3  & M3). In this 
case, it would not be safe to assume that because neurofeedback failed to change P3 and M3 that the 
two are not causally related. The physical brain region might causally influence the mental state, yet 
the physical brain region does not afford neurofeedback training. Meaning that unsuccessful 
neurofeedback cannot be used to show that the brain measure isn’t causally related to mental 
phenomena through neurofeedback.  
An example of this, could be metrics that do not contain the “online” characteristic that fMRI holds 
such as structural brain volume (Kvamme et al., 2016,p.1-7; Weiskopf et al., 2004,p.1-3). Even if it 
as possible to measure in real-time the structural MRI (“rtsMRI”), it would still rationally be a dead-
end, since changes in structural brain volume would be too slow of a process to learn to regulate 
through neurofeedback (ibid.). The physical brain measure, in this case is brain volume, might 
ultimately play a causal role in the mental state, however there is no practical way for neurofeedback 
to address it. In other words, should the physical brain measure be “untrainable” through 
neurofeedback the method is not falsifiable, with respect to inferring causality (Sonne-Ragans, 
2012,p.48).   
Similarly, there could be instances where rtfMRI neurofeedback would be logically impossible for 
regulating a given mind-brain causal relationship. As an example, in a meta-analysis by Emmert et 
al., (2015) showed that the anterior insular cortex (AIC) to be involved in neurofeedback regulation 
per se, independent of the targeted region (Emmert et al., 2015,p.1-5). The authors explain the 
findings by linking it with prior evidence showing the AIC to be involved in the self-regulation in 
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domains not involving neurofeedback. Thus, down-regulation of the AIC presents itself  as a “catch-
22” situation where attempts to regulate it would result in up-regulation rather than down-regulation 
(A. Brühl, personal communication, April 8, 2015). Here, establishing causal relationships through 
neurofeedback is deemed unlikely because of the coherence criteria. In other words we can rationally 
infer that rt-sMRI and down-regulation of AIC is impossible. Yet, one cannot on the basis of this, 
conclude that the same ”untrainable” physical brain measure is not causally involved in the mental 
state. In fact, in the case of AIC it is very likely that low activity in said region corresponds with a 
mental state characterized by poor self-regulatory ability, yet neurofeedback cannot directly 
investigate it.  
One can envision future instances of mind-brain causal relationships, where neurofeedback is made 
impossible through the coherence criteria, rendering the method incapable of investigating such 
relationships. In terms of neurofeedback as analytical tool, it has a tendency to focus on causal 
relationships between brain and mind, where the brain can be trained through neurofeedback. As such 
the use of neurofeedback as a research strategy may make it more likely that one overlooks mind-
brain causal relationships where the brain is untrainable. In short, the strategy of testing multiple 
regions is advantageous and highlights neurofeedback’s ability gather specificity for a given mind-
brain causal relationship. However in the case where neurofeedback is ineffective, one cannot 
conclude the non-existence of a causal relationship between mind and brain making its causal 
inferential potential unpromising. 
 
5.2.4 Unidirectional causal relationships 
The bold claim when dealing with neurofeedback and causal inference is that “neurofeedback informs 
of unidirectional causal relationship from brain to mind”. Prima facie the claim may appear correct, 
as what is seen first is the change of neural activity in the brain and then what is measured is its effect 
on a subjective mental state. This follows from a perspective taken by a biomedical model holding an 
eliminative reductionist position where brain states are seen as the inevitable primary causal 
determinant of the mental state (P   M) (Lilienfeld, 2007,p.2f). Through the lenses of neurofeedback 
one could be drawn to this argument since the aim of neurofeedback lies in primarily changing a brain 
state such ACC activity and then seeing the consequence on the mental state such as subjective 
craving for cigarettes or subjective pain sensation. However, such an argument is flawed since the 
change in mental state and brain state could happen concurrently.  
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In the example provided by Hanlon (2013) and Li (2013) and colleagues, regarding how reducing 
ACC activity was related to a subsequent reduced craving of cigarettes (Hanlon et al., 2013,p.1-3; Li 
et al., 2013,p.1-9). Here, it appears as if the brain state satisfied the causal criteria of temporality, that 
just prior to the mental state, the brain was in a particular state so as to causing the mind state in a 
“bottom-up” fashion. This would be the argumentation from a causal reductionist position, that of 
brain causing mind. However another interpretation is that neurofeedback change of the brain state 
and mental state happens concurrently. In fact the method provided by Hanlon (2013) and Li (2013) 
and colleagues seem to support this insofar as asking participants to perform a particular mental 
strategy of “reducing craving” and that this holds potential in reducing ACC activity in combination 
with neurofeedback of the ACC (ibid.). In this way, the authors are recognizing that intrinsic mental 
change is interconnected with inducing a brain change. One could, equally argue for mental causation 
whereby the mental strategy of reducing craving has “downward” causation on the physical brain 
measure (M  P) ( Bagdasaryan and Le Van Quyen, 2013,p.1-7; Chalmers, 2003,p.29)  
 
However, on further inspection the temporality criteria is not really present when discussing mind 
and brain, as the above show no real evidence pointing to mind state “before” or “after” brain state, 
and one could counter-argue they could just as well codetermine each other continuously. The process 
of neurofeedback involves the process of viewing brain state and introspective mental state 
simultaneously, discounting the mental processes manifestation would most likely erroneous. Even 
in the case of the strongest argument for a mechanistic brain cause mind (P  M) would have to be 
in case of the exogenously controlled closed loop paradigm. As described, this specific paradigm 
“waits” until a certain brain activity is in a certain way and then triggers an event. Here, the induction 
and thus presence of a low ratio of SMA/DMN activity resulted in a larger degree of surprise to a 
subsequent reaction time test (Hinds et al., 2013,p.1-9). On close inspection however the appearance 
of a temporality criterion is actually not present, since the decreased ratio of SMA/DMN activity 
could be happening concurrently with the mental state of being less prepared and this could causally 
related to the degree of surprise when the stimuli is presented. One can argue that in subject matter 
of mind and brain the temporality criteria of causality is not possible to attain. As contrasted with a 
typical experimental trial on the toxic effects of a given drug, one can derive a causal account of the 
drug on a given disease or symptom because the toxin can be introduced before the symptom showing 
a clear cause and then effect relationship. However, in the case of mind and brain, the present author 
knows no method to achieve brain state that is isolated from a corresponding mind state. Although 
the exogenously controlled closed loop paradigm “waits” for a specific brain state and measures the 
60 | P a g e  
 
states effect on a subsequent mind state it cannot conclude that the brain state was without an 
associated mind state. 
In other words it seems unlikely that neurofeedback can provide evidence that support a unidirectional 
causality from brain to mind. This does not negate the ability of neurofeedback to highlight causal 
relationships, in a way it actually strengthens the notion of causal reciprocity between P and M. In 
summery the question of whether the brain process unidirectional cause mental process or the reverse 
cannot be inferred through neurofeedback and one can only presume they are manifestations of the 
same phenomena evolving together (deCharms, 2007,p.5).  
 
5.2.5 Moderation Factor 
As mentioned EEG and rtfMRI neurofeedback satisfy the Hill’s (1965) causal criteria of plausibility 
insofar as they their processes tie in with the rest of the brains processes. For example, since EEG has 
shown to be causally linked with cerebral metabolism and blood flow, neurotransmitter release etc., 
it is plausible that these methods could have widespread effects on several mental functions and 
dysfunctions (Duff, 2004,p.1-5; Ros et al., 2014,p.5-10). Supporting this, it was shown that EEG-
neurofeedback has been applied to a wide spectrum of mental disorders. In this respect, the wide-
ranging characteristic is advantageous for the plausibility of neurofeedback in informing about mind-
brain causal relationships.  
However, it may also be presented as a weakness of the method since it is unknown, whether it is the 
intended physiological target of neurofeedback or the succeeding physiological changes that may be 
the actual primary reason for the change in mental state. This is also related to the weakness of the 
“conditioning and repair” model of neurofeedback, since it is often hard to isolate exactly which 
element of the broad neurofeedback intervention may be contributing to the therapeutic process 
(Drechsler et al., 2007,p.1f; Egner et al., 2004,p.1f; Othmer et al., n.d.,p.1-4). As an example it was 
shown that neurofeedback of some frequency bands could propagate throughout a large array of 
frequencies due to cross-frequency modulation (Canolty and Knight, 2012,p.1-4; Canolty et al., 
2009,p.1) 
Neurofeedback’s broad effects runs the risk of failing to show specificity in terms of a mind-brain 
causal relationship. It is the very nature of the cognitive neuroscience to isolate the specific biological 
process that is linked with the mental phenomena (Cromby, 2007,p.11). When taken to the extreme, 
it would mean that to explain neurofeedback one would have to point to the sbrain in its entirety in 
order to explain the mental phenomena. Then, the need to specific neurofeedback on an 
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implementational neurobiological level of analysis carries with it no information. In this case when 
explanation becomes so broad as it crosses over and could as well be address it in terms of psychology 
rather than making an appeal to neuroscience.  
One crucial consideration when discussing neurofeedback’s potential to inform of mind-brain causal 
relationships regards whether neurofeedback induced change of the brain state acts as primary causal 
factor in changing the mental state or whether it acted as a moderating factor. This is similar to the 
therapeutic role of neurofeedback as viewed from the “skill-acquisition” model, mentioned earlier. In 
this view the way in which neurofeedback exerts it’s therapeutic effects are not causally primary, 
however the method teaches the individual self-regulatory techniques that generalize allowing for 
other therapeutic processes to exert the primary causal effect. In other words, even if neurofeedback 
was necessary it may not be sufficient cause, the mind-brain causally induced changed would  
dependent on another factor.  
For instance, the analysis of EEG allows one to create links between mental disorders and specific 
EEG characteristics. As an example, individuals with a substance use disorder such as alcohol 
dependence will typically display abnormal patterns in alpha and beta frequencies (Sokhadze et al., 
2008,p.1-19). However, non-alcohol-dependent individual who are relatives of alcohol dependent 
individuals also have similar abnormal patterns in the alpha and beta frequencies as compared with 
individuals without alcohol-dependent individuals (ibid.). This indicates that the EEG differences 
may not impact alcohol use directly, but may serve as a vulnerability factor for the development of 
alcohol-dependence and thus not  primary cause. Hence, in the falling man analogy, EEG 
abnormalities may be akin to the condition of being on the plane, which is not sufficient in making 
sure the man falls to his death. Similarly, by extension one should be cautious in arguing that EEG-
neurofeedback that reduces the abnormally plays a causal role in alleviation of mental dysfunctions 
associated with alcohol dependence. This does not render EEG neurofeedback useless, in fact it is 
rather advantageous, to have a therapeutic method serving as moderating preventive factor or as an 
add-on treatment to other established treatments (Cantor and Evans, 2014,p.265ff).  
 
In a recent review, it was advocated that the EEG-neurofeedback of ADHD may in part be working 
through a moderating factor rather than as a directly causal factor (Arns and Kenemans, 2014,p.1-
10). In short, several lines of evidence indicate that unstable vigilance has repercussions for 
attentional networks in general and that this may provide a framework for explaining ADHD 
symptomology.  Similarly it has been shown that ADHD symptomology has been associated with 
worse sleep duration, daytime sleepiness and sleep disorders. Moreover, symptoms traditionally 
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associated with ADHD can be induced in healthy children with sleep restriction, suggesting an 
overlap between ADHD symptoms and sleep-disruption. Thus in a consideration of the causal 
relationship between neurofeedback and alleviation of ADHD symptomology, it could be possible 
that sleep as a third link in the causal chain intersects the cause and effect. Thus the hypothesis that 
is brought forth is that neurofeedback may exert it’s effects by normalizing brain networks involved 
in circadian rhythm, and  thus through enhanced sleep may relate to improved cognitive factors such 
as attention and vigilance (ibid.). To summarize, in inferring mind-brain causal relationship, even 
though neurofeedback ties in with the brain in several ways and thus has plausible explanations for 
how it may exert an effect, it may do so indirectly. Thus a key limitation of inferring causality through 
neurofeedback lies in its inability to ascertain whether the neurofeedback intervention is causally 
primary or rather represents a moderating factor. 
 
5.2.6 Eliminating competing causal hypotheses 
Scientific inquiry often seeks to confirm or verify hypotheses by eliminating competing alternatives 
to the point where only a single well-supported candidate theory remains (Holowchak, 2007,p.102f). 
As Sherlock Holmes advised Dr Watson, “When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever 
remains, however improbable, must be the truth” (Hill, 1965,p.4). Here, it will be argued that 
neurofeedback holds a potential not in establishing mind-brain causal relationships but in eliminating 
competing ones or rather informing of their inability to explain the data at hand.  
To date, the exact nature and causal relationship between conscious intention and brain signals 
preceding movement is  debated amongst philosophers and neuroscientists (Haggard, 2005,p.1-2). A 
common assumption is that of the Cartesian dualist position, that the mind chooses between available 
actions and then causes the body via the brain to perform the selected action. However as was shown 
in the seminal papers by Benjamin Libet, preparatory brain signals known as the readiness potential 
(RP) precedes the conscious intention to move (Haggard, 2005,p.1-2; Libet et al., 1983,p.1-19). One 
important question that arises from this finding is whether an individual can still exert a conscious 
“veto” decision and inhibit movement after the onset of the RP (Kühn et al., 2009,p.1-9; Misirlisoy 
and Haggard, 2014,p.1-4). Alternatively, the onset of the RP triggers a “ballistic” causal chain of 
events that is sufficient in causing the movement and thus makes any conscious inhibitory overriding 
of the movement impossible (De Jong et al., 1990,p.1-16). A recent study by Schultze-Kraft et al., 
(2015) sought to evaluate these mind-brain causal relationships by presenting subjects with a task in 
which they were rewarded for pressing a button when prompted with a green “go signals” and 
negatively reinforced should they press the button after a red “stop signal” (Schultze-Kraft et al., 
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2015,p.1-5). A key novel aspect of the study was that the subjects RP and muscle activity was being 
detected by a brain-computer interface (BCI). Prediction of movements were made in real time by 
the BCI and would present the stop signal in order to interrupt the subjects movement. Thus the 
paradigm was an EEG based exogenously controlled closed loop, where the neurofeedback was not 
fed back to the subject but rather, was used to trigger an event, in this case a stop signal. The results 
showed that subjects could in fact still veto the movement even after the onset of the RP suggesting 
that the onset of the RP is not sufficient for the final movement. Moreover, cancellation of movement 
was possible only if the triggered stop signal occurred 200 milliseconds (ms) before movement onset, 
thereby constituting a point of no return (ibid.). Here, the real-time EEG neurofeedback is used in a 
manner that allows for an evolving experimental paradigm (Sulzer et al., 2013,p.2-7). Similar, to the 
way Hinds et al., 2013, who also used an exogenously controlled loop to decide when an external 
event would occur (Hinds et al., 2013,p.1-9). In this way, the paradigm uses brain measures as the IV 
and can thus more optimally inform about mind-brain causal relationships by delineating the time 
points of onset of RP and the point of no return. It was shown that the RP in itself is not sufficient to 
cause movement but requires the lack of a veto inhibition before it results in any movement (Schultze-
Kraft et al., 2015,p.1-5). However, the improved delineation of time points also allowed researchers 
to provide evidence for a point of no return occurring 200 ms before movement onset. In summary, 
neurofeedback holds an advantage in comparison with traditional methods and allows researchers to 
create evolving experimental paradigms able to provide evidence for and against mind-brain causal 
hypotheses. 
 
5.2.7 Identifying unpredicted cognitive processes 
In the following section it will be reviewed how neurofeedback has the potential to uncover mind-
brain causal relationships that is unexpected by the theoretical construct (Micoulaud-Franchi et al., 
2014,p.1-7). It is informative, first to explain the two traditional ways neuroscience progresses, that 
of the neuropsychological approach (NP) of analysing the structure and function of the brain as the 
IV and measuring the corresponding variation in specific cognitive activities as the DV (ibid.). As an 
example of an NP could be how patients with brain lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) show a deficit in a certain type of decision-making situation as measured by the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT) when compared with healthy participants (Bechara and Damasio, 2005,p.1-
33). Another tradition within neuroscience is that of the psychophysiological approach (PP), which 
is generally applied to intact brains measured through neuroimaging as the DV obtained while the 
participant performs a prescribing task containing a cognitive process of interest as the IV which is 
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captured by an appropriate behavioural measure (Micoulaud-Franchi et al., 2014,p.1-7). For instance, 
measuring the neural activity related to masked and unmasked stimulus presentation and then 
inferring based on verbal reports that one was perceptually conscious and another unconscious 
(Dehaene et al., 2001,p.1;Sandberg et al., 2014,p.1). In both cases (NP and PP) require an externally 
controlled theoretical construct for the mental phenomena, in this case advantageous decision making 
in the IGT or perceptual consciousness of masked and unmasked stimuli respectively (Micoulaud-
Franchi et al., 2014,p.1-7). The theoretical construct is “externally” controlled since the experimenter 
externally imposes the cognitive task based on a theoretical construct. The design of the task attempts 
to eliminate possible confounding factors as well as to ensure the reliability of the task. On the other 
hand, these approaches fail to take into account those cognitive processes not predicted by the 
theoretical construct; as they can only take account of those cognitive processes that were expected. 
In case of the NP approach, it would be circular reasoning to state that cognitive performance 
measured through behavioural responses directly conveys the function of the localized neural 
substrate (e.g. “IGT measures vmPFC function”), given that, that task was constructed from 
behaviour in the first place (e.g. to capture the core deficit of the vmPFC lesioned patients) (Bechara 
and Damasio, 2005,p.1-33; Bechara et al., 2000,p.3, 1994,p.1-8; Lindeløv, 2015,p.8). Further, the 
prescribed cognitive task has a tendency to validate its own axiomatic theoretical construct even 
though such constructs play a large role in prescribing the specific cognitive task. In the case of 
vmPFC lesions resulting in a deficit in decision-making as measured by the IGT, the results are not 
surprising since that was the goal of the task, i.e. to show a deficit. One could just as easily envision 
a cognitive process where vmPFC lesions may be advantageous (Damasio,1994,p.192-194).  
In the case of the PP approach, the neural measure is isolated through contrastive analysis of the 
cognitive process where behavioural responses have been tailored to inform about the theoretical 
construct. In the paradigm investigating the neural measures of perceptually consciousness, the 
externally controlled theoretical construct has as a presupposition the all-or-none dichotomy between 
conscious and unconscious perception (Dehaene et al., 2001,p.1;Sandberg et al., 2014,p.1). The 
perceptual experience of the participant is being constrained by the theoretical construct into two 
different manifestations of the mental phenomena without allowing for any measurement of the 
possible continuum in-between (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004,p.1-20). A further common 
misconception about the PP approach is that the discovered neural processes can be postulated as 
causing the mental phenomena, even though the neural contrasts were detected by virtue of the mental 
phenomena measured through a constrained behavioural task (Overgaard and Mogensen, 2014,p.1f). 
In other words ‘How we measure in large part determines what we measure – or, perhaps more 
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precisely, what we think we are measuring’ (Uttal, 2001 cited from Micoulaud-Franchi et al., 
2014,p.2).   
 
Figure 10. The frameworks compromising the “NeuroPsychological” approach and the “PsychoPhysiological” 
approach, IV: Independent Variable, DV:  Dependent Variable. Adapted from Micoulaud-Franchi et al., 2014,p.4   
Neurofeedback has a potential to be fundamentally different from the traditional NP and PP 
approaches as it can arguable uncover cognitive and mental processes not predicted by the theoretical 
construct. The theoretical construct in neurofeedback is “internally” controlled rather than externally, 
since it is the participant inside the neurofeedback loop who controls and thus develops the cognitive 
task. The cognitive processes is no longer governed by any prescribed task designed for validating a 
theoretical construct but rather the cognitive process is developed by the participants themselves in 
an attempt to influence activations in the brain where neurofeedback is derived. (ibid.).  
The mental phenomena is the product of “introneuroimaging” as proposed by deCharms, that of the 
participants own self-evolving cognitive process that can be perceived phenomenologically while 
physical processes take place in the brain during such experiences (deCharms, 2008,p.1). In a similar 
vein, a proposed scientific program in 1996 by Varela, the field of neurophenomenology is an attempt 
to combine first person subjective reports with third persons neurobiological data (Varela, 1996,p.1-
18). From a neurophenomenological point of view, neurofeedback has the potential to facilitate a 
particular brain activity whereby phenomenological inquiry can enable the subsequent gathering of 
participants verbatim statements as to their self-evolved cognitive processes in acquiring such brain 
activity (Bagdasaryan and Le Van Quyen, 2013,p.1-8; Micoulaud-Franchi and Quiles, 2014,p.1-7) 
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Such a methodology of combined neurophenomenological and neurofeedback approaches was 
recently used in a rtfMRI neurofeedback protocol to investigate the subjective experience of cognitive 
processes used in acquiring control over brain activity in the default mode network (DMN) during 
meditation (Garrison et al., 2013,p.1-8; Micoulaud-Franchi and Quiles, 2014,p.6f). In a study by 
Garrison and colleagues (2013), the first-person accounts of mental strategies were probed using 
grounded theory methodology while subjects where meditating and performing rtfMRI 
neurofeedback of a core region in the DMN called the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) (Garrison et 
al., 2013,p.1-8). Activation in the PPC above baseline has previously been found during self-
referential thinking, envisioning the future, conceding the perspective of others, mind-wandering and 
PPC deactivation during meditation or as contemplative traditions call it “being in the moment” 
(Brewer et al., 2011,p.1; Buckner et al., 2008,p.1-32; Mason et al., 2007,p.1-2). It’s important to 
realize that the previously mentioned mind-brain relationship are acquired using either the NP or PP 
approaches and thus implicitly use an externally controlled theoretical construct to prescribe the 
cognitive task in order to investigate the relationship. Here, in the study by Garrison et al., (2013) the 
authors wanted to investigate whether the up and down regulation of the PCC was associated with 
any as of yet unexplored subjective experiences (Garrison et al., 2013,p.1-8)  
The experiment consisted of experienced meditators going through a protocol aimed at progressively 
introducing neurofeedback into the meditation practice, thus slowly learning meditators how PCC 
activity corresponded with their own subjective experience. In breaks throughout the experiment, 
meditators were asked to describe their subjective experience during the meditation, and were 
replayed their brain activity  during meditation (offline feedback) and asked which strategy they used 
to change activity. The subjective experiences where then categorized using grounded methodology 
from open-coded verbatim reports to principal theoretical constructs and it was determined whether 
those constructs corresponded with decreased or increased PCC activity. The results showed that 
subjective experiences such as “effortless awareness” , “concentration” and “observing sensory 
experience” corresponded with PCC deactivation and experiences of “distracted awareness”, 
“interpreting” and “discontentment” with PCC activation. Intriguingly, the authors found several 
novel qualifiers in terms of the mind-brain relationship in which specific instances of mind-wandering 
did not illicit PPC activation. Below are exempts from the meditators self-reports in unsuccessful 
attempts to activate PPC which supposedly would occur during mind-wandering (ibid.).    
 
“Meditator 134 (run 12): For this meditation, now I just tried not to push it at all, I 
just wanted to see what would happen with just really resting, not visualizing 
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anything, not using anything as a tool, just opening up the space and resting, and I 
think towards the middle I had some thoughts which I don’t see on this graph maybe 
because I just let them kind of flow by, but I noticed some thoughts. (…) 
Meditator 141 (run 14): I was surprised that [the graph] was so blue [PCC 
deactivation] on that second part. I was observing a lot of what I was thinking, but I 
was thinking about a lot of things, for example, what I had to do the rest of the day “ 
(Garrison et al., 2013,p.7) 
 
It is unexpected that such instances of recurrent mind-wandering would result in PCC deactivation 
given the a priori established finding of increased PCC activity in mind-wandering (Mason et al., 
2007,p.1-2). On close inspection, the self-report of participants could be interpreted as reflecting 
instances where mind-waning has a certain quality to it, of not being forced or reactive but rather 
observing it as a non-judging and non-attached spectator. Mind-wandering leading to PPC activation 
may be distinguished by such instances where participants thoughts are not attempted to be pushed 
or shut off, instead they allow their mind to wander and just “let the thoughts be” (Garrison et al., 
2013,p.7; Kabat-Zinn, 1990,p 52f & 347f, 1982,p2; Leary et al., 2006,p.20). In contrast, according to 
Garrison et al., (2013) the subjective experience of mind wandering leading to increased PCC activity 
may contain a quality of reactivity to mental content or thoughts, such as rumination, desire or 
aversion toward the mental content akin to the notion of “getting caught up with one’s thoughts” 
(Garrison et al., 2013,p.7; Kabat-Zinn, 1990,p.76).  
The results raise a key point, that the combination of neurofeedback and phenomenology allowed the 
authors to uncover unexpected mental phenomena linked to the particular brain activity, not predicted 
by the a priori theoretical construct (Bagdasaryan and Quyen, 2013,p.1-8; Micoulaud-Franchi and 
Quiles, 2014,p.1-7). Thus, one of the potentials of neurofeedback for informing about mind-brain 
causal relationships lies in the synergistic effect of combining it with phenomenological approaches. 
In contrast, a PP approach that would hold deeply, an axiomatic presupposition of an all-or-none 
dichotomy between mind-wandering and non-mind-wandering would seek corresponding neural 
correlates of increased and decreased PCC activity respectively. Then through repeated measurement, 
a PP approach would gain a contrast of aggregates and mean values that would lead to a conclusion 
of an overall difference. 
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The approach would lack any phenomenological constraints and thus be ineffective in uncovering 
that mind-wandering can be qualified as passively spectated or as a reactive phenomenon, thus failing 
to detect the subtle nuanced description of the mental phenomena. Here, information from first- and 
third-person perspectives is braided together in the iterative closed loop, that is internally guided by 
the participants themselves. In the spirit of Varela’s proposal for neurophenomenology the mental 
phenomena is not purely investigated through the lenses of the cognitive sciences nor 
phenomenology, but rather what is concluded is mutually constrained by each. This is not to say that 
the NP and PP approaches should be entirely replaced by neurofeedback, but rather that they suffer 
from limitations that neurofeedback can ameliorate (ibid.). By no means does neurofeedback in 
conjunction with neurophenomenology in this instance show a causal relationship between PPC 
activity and the experience associated with it. Yet, it does provide an approach that can uncover  mind-
brain relationships not predicted by the theoretical construct which may thus further subsequent 
investigations into its causal nature. 
 
5.2.8 Methodological pluralism 
The above mentioned aspects of neurofeedback’s potential and limitations for addressing causality 
may appear as a neurofeedback”centric” perspective on causal inferred, i.e. focused on making 
neurofeedback the exclusive tool for addressing causality. In discussing EEG and rtfMRI 
neurofeedback’s potential to inform of  mind-brain causality it’s crucial to recognize that causal 
accounts cannot be addressed through neurofeedback alone. Instead, the hypotheses that drive and 
foster neurofeedback research is made possible through prior psychological and neuroscientific 
research pointing at the plausibility for neurofeedback to modulate a specific mind-brain causal 
relationship. For example, the already-established relation between pain sensation and certain brain 
regions that show that ACC activity corresponds with the extra dimension of the emotional 
unpleasantness of pain. Here, a burgeoning literature is behind such an observation of the involvement 
of ACC in this particular mind-brain relationship (Peyron et al., 2000,p.1-21) Thus, neurofeedback 
as an analytical tool is not the exclusive tool for investigating the mind-brain relationship in question, 
but acts in unison with the entirety of the neuroscientific investigative arsenal of techniques. In 
inferring causality, neurofeedback does not hold the final verdict, and must follow the coherence 
criteria and inform of causal relationships without conflicting with prior knowledge about the mind-
brain causal relationships. This was exemplified through the arguments against rt-sMRI 
neurofeedback and down-regulation of AIC. These unpromising notions show that neurofeedback in 
certain situations has limitations such as an overfocus on the trainable mind-brain causal 
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relationships. It becomes paramount, for the future endeavour of neurofeedback researchers to remain 
wary of such dead-end research questions, that can be avoided on mere scientific coherence in contrast 
to a trial-and-error empirical agenda.  
 
A beneficial heuristic is to think of causal inference as science slowly triangulating which causal 
hypothesis is the most likely (Jick, 1979,p.2; Novella, 2015,p.160). One empirical study in isolation 
cannot be used to infer a causal mind-brain relationship, such inferences are typically the product of  
gradual piecemeal collection studies pointing towards one hypothesis above another. Methodological 
triangulation in this context means the “combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomena” (Denzin, 1978,p.291 from Jick, 1979,p.2). When combining several methodologies in 
the validation process it ensures that the appearance of the phenomenon in question is reflective of 
the phenomena and not the methodology (ibid.). In this view, the role of neurofeedback to inform of 
mind-brain causal relationships achieves a higher degree of explanatory power than when used in 
isolation. Thus, the framework for establishing causal rather than mere inferential accounts is made 
possible by embracing methodological pluralism as opposed to purism (du Plessis, 2012,p.1-3; 
Lilienfeld, 2007,p.1-8).  
 
Throughout this chapter several examples of neurofeedback research bear witness to the advantages 
of addressing causality using multiple methodologies. In addressing the susceptibility of 
neurofeedback to tertium quid arguments regarding another brain region having causal primacy in 
the mind-brain causal relationship. Such causal hypotheses lead to testable empirical predictions, that 
can be addressed through other technical methods in neuroimaging such as granger causality and 
dynamic causal modelling. Moving forward neurofeedback could potentially gain an even greater 
causal explanatory power by merging with other interventional techniques such as TMS and tDCS 
(Sitaram et al., 2012,p.1; Sulzer et al., 2013,p.6f;Clarke et al., 2014,p.1; Sliwinska et al., 2014,p.1). 
A testable prediction that would provide increased likelihood of causal primacy between 
neurofeedback regulation of brain region and a mental phenomenon, would be if TMS disruption 
limited to said region specifically hindered the acquisition of the neurofeedback learning. Moreover, 
anodal or cathodal tDCS stimulations should facilitate or attenuate respectively, the learning of 
neurofeedback for the region expected to be causally primary. Compared with these techniques 
neurofeedback and in particular rtfMRI allow for a greater whole brain coverage and spatial 
resolution of anatomical structures that are unreachable to TMS and tDCS. Applying these methods 
in unison allow for a greater degree of explanatory power as compared with neurofeedback in 
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isolation. In other words the limitation of neurofeedback is ameliorated by incorporating 
methodological pluralism.  
Methodological pluralism is advantageous within neurofeedback itself, as was seen with Schultze-
Kraft et al., (2015) study, aiming to delineate the point of no return  in vetoing movements and the 
causal role of the RP (Schultze-Kraft et al., 2015,p.1-5). Here real-time EEG neurofeedback is the 
wiser choice, as the temporal resolution of EEG allows for close to millisecond precision whereas 
rtfMRI has greater temporal delay in its measurements. As a contrast, fMRI measurements allow for 
investigation of deeper brain structures such as the ACC which was seen in the example by deCharms 
et al. (2005). Here, methodological pluralism takes the form of researchers eclectically choosing 
which method is best suited for investigating the particular mind-brain causal relationship (Sonne-
Ragans, 2012,p.33-45). Thus, when defining a research question regarding a specific mind-brain 
causal relationship a key consideration is which neurofeedback modality the relationship affords to 
be investigated through.   
Another core advantage of methodological pluralism in neurofeedback comes with use of mental 
strategies and the induction of certain mental states used through either hypnosis or meditative 
techniques. In fact, authors in these disciplines support  the notion of methodological and conceptual 
overlap of meditation and hypnosis and neurofeedback (Batty et al., 2006,p.1-3; Brandmeyer and 
Delorme, 2013,p.1-3; Gruzelier, 2014a,p.1-9; Warner et al., 2000,p.1-3). In regard to deCharms et 
al., (2005) the study was influenced by the amounting evidence that hypnosis could influence the 
specific unpleasant component of the pain sensation  (deCharms et al., 2005,p.1-5; Rainville et al., 
1997,p.1-3). The result of the study can be viewed both as a replication of the hypnosis findings in 
addition to an argument for the combination of hypnosis and neurofeedback methodology (ibid.). 
Moreover, the study by Garrison et al. (2013), the participants were experienced meditators which 
allowed valuable insights into the subjective experience of effortless awareness associated with PCC 
activity (Garrison et al., 2013,p.1-8). Furthermore, the study is beneficial for both methodologies, as 
meditative practices appear to be a prime candidate for improving learning in neurofeedback studies, 
and neurofeedback may equally provide a medium through which meditative practices become even 
more compelling in terms of efficacy (Garrison et al., 2013,p.1-8; Hanlon et al., 2013,p.3). If one 
were to provide an answer as to a question of a short-cut to achieve what contemplatives term “being 
in the moment” or “one-pointed concentration”  based on the results from Garrison et al. (2013), may 
tentatively be neurofeedback down-regulation of the PCC (Brewer et al., 2011,p.1; Brefczynski-
Lewis et al., 2007,p.1f; Garrison et al., 2013,p.1-8). Keeping in mind that, this appeal to 
neuroanatomy provide only an explanation on the implementational level of analysis, where 
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neurofeedback and meditation techniques serve as the algorithm to achieve the goal of the subjective 
experience and therapeutic gains of the mental phenomena, situated at the computational level.  
A similar advantage of methodological pluralism is seen with neurofeedback when used in 
conjunction with a neurophenomenological approach to uncover mind-brain causal relationships not 
predicted by the theoretical construct. The example provided by Garrison et al. (2013), show the 
phenomenological approach of taking human first-person experience as a central component that thus 
allows one to constrain the neuroscientific interpretations of the data for a more nuanced view of the 
phenomena (Bagdasaryan and Le Van Quyen, 2013,p.1-8; Micoulaud-Franchi and Quiles, 2014,p.1-
7; Garrison et al., 2013,p.1-8). Such, a style of inquiry may also be beneficial on behalf of discovering 
instances where explicit instructions for participants to perform during neurofeedback allow a more 
efficient self-regulation (Sulzer et al., 2013,p.4). 
In summary, neurofeedback research is not exclusively involved in addressing mind-brain causal 
relationships, in fact the above mentioned material exemplifies the complementary nature of 
combining neurofeedback with other methodologies. Neurofeedback research often builds on 
plausible already-established scientific mind-brain relationships and attempts to triangulate which 
causal relationship is most likely. Here, incorporating a wide variety of quantitative and qualitative 
methods into neurofeedback research methodology allows a larger degree of explanatory power. 
Thus, a defining characteristic for the scientific discipline of neurofeedback moving forward in 
maximizing it’s explanatory power is adopting methodological pluralism (Feyerabend, 1993,p.21).  
 
6. Conclusion 
Throughout the thesis several key aspects of the degree to which neurofeedback can inform of mind-
brain causal relationship arose. In the introductory piece on the principles of biofeedback the root 
question of induction of certain conscious states were addressed as well as ability of neurofeedback 
to provide therapeutic benefit. Another important principle was that of how neurofeedback relies on 
the ability of a plastic nervous system to transparently interface readily with electronic devices and 
thus extends the human capacity to self-regulate. In the chapter on electroencephalography, the 
neurophysiological backdrop for the extent of neurofeedback to train and treat a wide spectrum of 
mental functions and dysfunctions was shown. Here, the “conditioning-and-repair” and the “skill-
acquisition” models hold competing assumptions, favour different methodologies and lead to 
opposing predictions about the ability of neurofeedback to causally effect mind-brain relationships.  
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In order to facilitate a deeper understanding of neurofeedback and the competing models, exemplary 
evidence was presented from an on-going investigation into the neural signatures of foreign language 
learning efficiency. On the basis of this, a series of hypotheses were generated to provide further 
direct evidence for either model in addition to examining a causal  mind-brain relationship. The fourth 
chapter aimed to review the basis of the second major neurofeedback modality of real-time functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (rtfMRI). The review’s focal point was methodological advantages of 
rtfMRI to experimentally test multiple brain regions and their activity as the independent variable for  
given mental phenomena, in addition to designing dynamically evolving paradigms. 
In facing up to the question of causality inferred through neurofeedback, the last chapter facilitated 
an understanding how to attain causal scientific accounts of any phenomenon. Following this, the 
subsequent discussion deliberated several key limitation in addition to advantages when arguing for 
the extent of neurofeedback to investigate of mind-brain causal relationships. Here, the present author 
outlined key challenges of neurofeedback for inferring causality, one of which was susceptibility to 
tertium quid argumentation. Moreover, at present it seems unlikely that neurofeedback can inform of 
a brain state to be unidirectional causing a mind state and the method is unpromising in resolving 
mind-brain states in the face of untrainable brain measures. Through this line of questioning the 
potential of neurofeedback for informing of mind-brain causality several advantages arose, 
specifically the extent of the method to provide evidence for the fulfilment of several of Hill’s causal 
criteria such as biological gradients and experimenting with the brain as a dependent measure. Further 
advantages presented including driving specificity of causal mind-brain relationships by testing 
multiple neural substrates, that plausibly codetermine the mind-brain relationship. In addition, the 
methodological advantage of creating dynamic evolving experimental paradigms through 
exogenously controlled loops able to more clearly delineate mind-brain relationship and pinpoint 
shortcomings of competing causal hypotheses, was presented. One of the potentials of neurofeedback 
for inferring causality, came in the form of eliminating causal accounts by its use of an evolving 
paradigm. This is a strong case against neurofeedback establishing causal relationships, but rather 
shows it potential to do the opposite, (i.e., to falsify existing causal hypotheses). A noteworthy 
potential of neurofeedback was the methodological synergy created when the method is paired with 
the neurophenomenological tradition. Here, an example illustrated how neurofeedback can overcome 
the shortcomings of the conventional traditions of the neuropsychological approach and the 
psychophysiological approach and uncover mind-brain relationships not predicted by the theoretical 
construct. The deliberation of the key pros and cons of neurofeedback for causal inference of mind-
brain relationships culminated in the argument that the limitations are ameliorated and the potentials 
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increased when paired with other methodologies and thus an appeal to methodological pluralism was 
made. With regard to inferring causal relationships, neurofeedback enters into a reciprocal 
relationship with other disciplines in order to provide plausibility and coherence for particular mind-
brain relationships. While neurofeedback may harbour susceptibility for tertium quid argumentation, 
such limitations can be ameliorated by pursuing other avenues for inferring causality in neuroscience. 
A further argument for methodological pluralism was seen in the intriguing mind-brain relationships 
uncovered when neurofeedback incorporates methodologies such as hypnosis and meditation. In 
moving forward, the largest potential of neurofeedback for inferring causal mind-brain relationships 
is more realized through a combined effort of several psychological and neuroscientific 
methodologies.   
Looking back to the present thesis initial conceptualization of the causal rank as a distinct from the 
inferential rank, one can argue that such a notion is plagued by a false premise. The thorny question 
of causality and the extent to which neurofeedback can investigate mind-brain causal relationships is 
one of gradual increases in certainty and not an all or nothing event. Neurofeedback’s ability induce 
change in mental states (M) by manipulating physical brain measure (P) spawns a multitude of causal 
hypothesis about the nature of the relationship between M  and P. It is erroneous to assume that there 
is a clear demarcation between when something is a causal and when something is only inferential. It 
is a false dichotomy to state that a causal hypothesis can be either wholly justified or utterly discarded, 
rather hypotheses exist of a continuum of relatively more confidence in a causal hypothesis of a the 
phenomenon. The denoting of a relationship as “causal” or “inferential” should be proposed only for 
analytical clarity or didactic purposes as they represent extreme poles of scientific ranks. Thus a new 
understanding of how mind-brain causal relationships can be informed through neurofeedback, one 
that highlights the continuum of causal likelihood between an inferential account and a causal one. 
Inferring causality based on one study alone is highly unlikely, such inferences are usually the product 
of several studies and methodologies pointing to a common parsimonious causal hypothesis. As 
proposed by Hill’s, his nine criteria for a causal relation represents the likelihood of a causal relation, 
not it’s certainty (Hill, 1965,p.1-6). Equally, researchers using EEG and rtfMRI-based paradigms 
shouldn’t state how they can, instead how they might address questions of causality as opposed to 
mere correlations (Sulzer et al., 2013,p.6). With the aim of fostering a virtuous scientific research 
program involving neurofeedback, researchers should be compelled to describe with caution their 
inferences regarding causality and only make such claims in the event of burgeoning research and 
meticulous data suggests it. Of cause such notions of the reciprocity of mind and brain are typically 
assumed implicitly.  
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The ontological question often arises which is whether the changes in brain activation derive from 
changes in mind states or whether brain activation causes changes in mind states. With 
neurofeedback, the presumption is often that the brain activation and mental processes are correlated 
manifestations of the same phenomena. When discussing whether neurofeedback could provide 
unidirectional causal relationships it was found that such notions are still unlikely for neurofeedback 
to addresses. Moving forward researchers within the field of neurofeedback should be compelled to 
realize that mind and brain change bidirectionally through training (deCharms, 2007,p.5). In fact, as 
was shown with the ability of neurofeedback to identify unpredicted cognitive processes by braiding 
first- and third-person perspectives into an iterative closed loop is able to address the mental changes 
as they occur with changes in the brain.  
The present author will argue that what is gained through neurofeedback is more than just an 
association, since one is consequently more certain of a causal link within the mind-brain relationship, 
as opposed to only knowing that induction of the mental state through experimental means led to a 
particular brain activity. The later evidence  alone cannot rule out that brain activity is epiphenomenal 
to the mental function or state (Keizer et al., 2010,p.1-4). When inducing the mental state via 
neurofeedback one has gained the additional information that inducing a particular brain activity have 
particular mental states associated with it. Even if such a cause-effect relationship is qualified by 
several reservations such as the exhaustive investigations of multiple regions postulated through 
tertium quid argumentation and that the relationship is only bidirectional (i.e., no mechanistic or high 
specificity to the causal account).  
In culminating on an answer to the problem statement, the present thesis has featured several 
examples of the potential of neurofeedback to provide evidence for and against mind-brain causal 
relationships. In light of the discussion and the reviewed evidence, the question posed by thesis of 
whether “we through the extent of neurofeedback research to investigate mind-brain relationships 
have consequently satisfied a scientific causal account of a codetermining law between mind and 
brain” would accordingly be answered; “it depends”. It depends on this new understanding of how 
mind-brain causal relationships can be inferred, one which gradually increases in likelihood. It also 
depends on the criteria of inferring causality, such as whether unidirectional or a bidirectional 
causality satisfies as a causal account. It further depends on the whether it is the“conditioning-and-
repair” model or the “skill-acquisition” model that most adequately describes the neurofeedback 
processes, as these models pose different explanatory accounts of the impact neurofeedback had on a 
mind-brain relationship. Additionally, the causal inference of neurofeedback for mind-brain 
relationships comes with a susceptibility to tertium quid counterarguments and instances where 
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neurofeedback may over-focus on trainable brain regions, and thus miss dimensions of the mind-
brain relationship. As was shown, the limitations of the neurofeedback method can be ameliorated 
through the use of methodological pluralism in informing of such mind-brain causal relationships. 
However most importantly, where neurofeedback does provide an advantage in informing of causality 
compared with concurrent methods or when it is paired with other methods, it or they cannot do so 
to any absolute, but rather through a steady incremental increase in the likelihood of a mind-brain 
causal relationship.  
At the present moment, it is thus unknown if neurofeedback will truly allow inference on mind-brain 
causality in any absolute sense. Although, it can be argued, that in the grand scheme of things the 
dichotomy between inferential and causal scientific accounts remain entirely justified. Executing this 
argument, involves a parallel to evolutionary biology. Here, the notion of gradualism states that 
evolution happens in a steady and gradual transformation of species in a smooth and continuous 
fashion. This conjecture, dominated evolutionary thinking until Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay 
Gould proposed the new theory of punctuated equilibrium, that evolution goes through long periods 
of stasis followed by rapid bursts of macro change (Eldredge and Gould, 1972,p.1-35). Analogously, 
I will argue that the progression of the neuroscientific field stand at an inflection point in the 
progression of scientific ranks of explanations. Here, the key conditions of supporting a potential 
rapid change is the advent of newer methods, one of which is neurofeedback. 
To state in an absolute sense, that an observed relationship has transcended from a mere inferential 
to a truly causal account is most likely an inappropriate conception as causal hypotheses increase 
gradually in likelihood. However, in the grand scheme of scientific progression, the neuroscientific 
discipline stands at decisive moment. A moment where the potential of neurofeedback for causal 
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